CALVIN’S  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD. 


Having  expounded  in  the  opening  chapters  of  the  Insti- 
tutes the  sources  and  means  of  the  knowledge  of  God,  Cal- 
vin naturally  proceeds  in  the  next  series  of  chapters  (I.  x, 
xi,  xii,  xiii)  to  set  forth  the  nature  of  the  God  who,  by  the 
revelation  of  Himself  in  His  Word  and  by  the  prevalent 
internal  operation  of  His  Spirit,  frames  the  knowledge  of 
Himself  in  the  hearts  of  His  people.  He  who  expects  to 
find  in  these  chapters,  however,  an  orderly  discussion  of  the 
several  topics  which  make  up  the  locus  de  Deo  in  our  for- 
mal dogmatics,  will  meet  with  disappointment.  Calvin  is 
not  writing  out  of  an  abstract  scientific  impulse,  but  with  the 
needs  of  souls,  and,  indeed,  also  with  the  special  demands 
of  the  day  in  mind.  And  as  his  purpose  is  distinctively  re- 
ligious, so  his  method  is  literar^  rather  than  scholastic.  In 
the  freedom  of  his  literary  manner,  he  had  permitted  him- 
self in  the  preceding  chapters  repeated  excursions  into  reg- 
ions which,  in  an  exact  arrangement  of  the  material,  might 
well  have  been  reserved  for  exploration  at  this  later  point. 
To  take  up  these  topics  again,  now,  for  fuller  and  more  or- 
derly exposition,  would  involve  much  repetition  without 
substantially  advancing  the  practical  purpose  for  which  the 
Institutes  were  written.  Calvin  was  not  a man  to  con- 
found formal  correctness  of  arrangement  with  substantial 
completeness  of  treatment ; nor  was  he  at  a loss  for  new  top- 
ics of  pressing  impbrfarfce^f or  discussion.  He  skillfully  in- 
terposes at  this  point,  therefore,  a short  chapter  (ch.  x)  in 
which  under  the  form  of  pointing  out  the  complete  har- 
mony with  the  revelation  of  God  in  nature  of  the  revela- 
tion of  God  in  the  Scriptures — the  divine  authority  of  which 
in  the  communication  of  the  knowledge  of  God  he  had  just 
demonstrated — he  reminds  his  readers  of  all  that  he  had 
formerly  said  of  the  nature  and  attributes  of  God  on  the  basis 
of  natural  revelation,  and  takes  occasion  to  say  what  it  re- 


382  THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 

mained  necessary  to  say  of  the  same  topics  on  the  basis  of 
supernatural  revelation.  Thus  he  briefly  but  effectively 
brings  together  under  the  reader’s  eye  the  whole  body  of  his 
exposition  of  these  topics  and  frees  his  hands  to  give  him- 
self, under  the  guidance  of  his  practical  bent  and  purpose,  to 
the  two  topics  falling  under  the  rubric  of  the  doctrine  of  God 
which  were  at  the  moment  of  the  most  pressing  import- 
ance. His  actual  formal  treatment  of  the  doctrine  of  God 
thus  divides  itself  into  two  parts,  the  former  of  which 
(ch.  xi,  xii),  in  strong  Anti-Romish  polemic  is  devoted  to 
the  uprooting  of  every  refuge  of  idolatry,  while  the  latter 
(ch.  xiii),  in  equally  strong  polemic  against  the  Anti-trini- 
tarianism  of  the  day,  develops  with  theological  acumen  and 
vital  faith  the  doctrine  of  Trinity  in  Unity. 

It  is  quite  true,  then,  as  has  often  been  remarked,  that 
the  Institutes  contain  no  systematic  discussion  of  the  exist- 
ence, the  nature  and  the  attributes  of  God.1  And  the  lack 
of  formal,  systematic  discussion  of  these  fundamental  top- 
ics, may,  no  doubt,  be  accounted  a flaw,  if  we  are  to  con- 
ceive the  Institutes  as  a formal  treatise  in  systematic  theol- 
ogy. But  it  is  not  at  all  true  that  the  Institutes  contain  no 
sufficient  indication  of  Calvin’s  conceptions  on  these  sub- 
jects : nor  is  it  possible  to  refer  the  absence  of  formal  dis- 
cussion of  them  either  to  indifference  to  them  on  Calvin’s 

1 Cf.  Kostlin,  Calvin's  Institutio,  etc.,  in  Studien  und  Kritiken,  1868, 
i,  pp.  61-2:  “On  the  other  hand — and  this  is  for  us  the  most  important 
matter, — there  is  not  given  there  any  comprehensive  exposition  of  the 
attributes,  especially  not  of  the  ethical  attributes  of  God,  nor  is  any 
such  afterwards  attempted.”  Again,  iii,  p.  423 : “We  cannot  present  and 
follow  out  the  doctrine  of  the  Institutio  on  the  divine  nature  and 
the  divine  attributes,  and  their  relations,  as  a whole,  as  we  can  its 
doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  because  Calvin  himself,  as  we  have  mentioned 
already,  has  nowhere  presented  them  as  a whole.”  Cf.  also  P.  J. 
Muller,  De  Godsleer  van  Zwingli  en  Calvijn , 1883,  p.  11 : “Neither  by 
Zwingli  nor  by  Calvin  are  there  offered  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God” 
{cf.  p.  16).  Again,  De  Godsleer  van  Calvijn,  1881,  p.  26:  “A  doctrine 
of  the  nature  of  God  as  such  we  do  not  find  in  Calvin.”  Ibid.,  p.  38: 
“We  find  nowhere  in  Calvin  a special  section  which  is  devoted  particu- 
larly to  the  nature  of  God’s  attributes”;  “since  he  gives  no  formal 
doctrine  of  the  attributes,  we  find  in  him  also  no  classification  of  the 
attributes.” 


383 


^(3H 

C ujo-. 

calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 

part  or  to  any  peculiarity  of  his  dogmatic  standpoint,2  or 
even  of  his  theological  method.3  The  omission  belongs 
rather  to  the  peculiarity  of  this  treatise  as  a literary  product. 
Calvin  does  not  pass  over  all  systematic  discussion  of  the 
existence,  nature  and  attributes  of  God  because  from  his 
theological  standpoint  there  was  nothing  to  say  upon  these 
topics,  nor  because,  in  his  theological  method,  they  were  in- 
significant for  his  system ; but  simply  because  he  had  been  led 
already  to  say  informally  about  them  all  that  was  necessary 
for  the  religious,  practical  purpose  he  had  in  view  in  writing 
this  treatise.  For  here  as  elsewhere  the  key  to  the  under- 
standing of  the  Institutes  lies  in  recognizing  their  fundamen- 
tal purpose  to  have  been  religious,  and  their  whole,  not  col- 
oring merely,  but  substance,  to  be  profoundly  religious, — in 
this  only  reflecting  indeed  the  most  determinative  trait  of 
Calvin’s  character. 

It  is  important  to  emphasize  this,  for  there  seems  to  be 
still  an  impression  abroad  that  Calvin’s  nature  was  at  bot- 
tom cold  and  hard  and  dry,  and  his  life-manifestation  but 
a piece  of  incarnated  logic : while  the  Institutes  themselves 
are  frequently  represented,  or  rather  misrepresented — it  is 
difficult  to  believe  that  those  who  so  speak  of  them  can  have 
read  them' — as  a body  of  purely  formal  reasoning  by  which 
intolerable  conclusions  are  remorselessly  deduced  from  a 
set  of  metaphysical  assumptions.4  Perhaps  M.  Ferdinand 

2 As  Kostlin,  for  example,  has  suggested,  as  cited,  p.  423,  followed 
by  P.  J.  Muller  in  his  earlier  work,  De  Godsleer  van  Calvijn,  1881, 
pp.  10,  46. 

3 So  P.  J.  Muller  expresses  himself  in  his  later  volume— De  Godsleer 
van  Zwingli  en  Calvijn,  1883,— modifying  his  earlier  view:  “Kostlin 
asks  if  it  does  not  belong  to  Calvin’s  dogmatic  standpoint  that  he  does 
not  venture  to  seek  after  a bond  between  the  several  elements  which 
come  forward  in  God’s  many-sided  relation  to  men.  This  question  can 
undoubtedly  be  answered  in  the  affirmative,  although  we  should  rather 
speak  here  of  the  peculiarity  of  Calvin’s  method.”  That  is  to  say, 
Muller  here  prefers  to  refer  the  phenomenon  in  question  to  Calvin’s 
a posteriori  method  rather  than  to  his  theological  standpoint. 

. 4 Andre  Duran,  Le  Mysticisme  de  Calvin,  1900,  p.  8,  justly  says: 
“The  Institutes  are  remarkable  precisely  for  this : the  absence  of  specu- 
lation. It  is  especially  with  the  heart  that  Calvin  studies  God  in  His 


A 51689 


384  THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 

Brunetiere  may  be  looked  upon  as  a not  unfair  representa- 
tive of  the  class  of  writers  who  are  wont  so  to  speak  of  the 
Institutes .5  According  to  him,  Calvin  has  “intellectualized” 
religion  and  reduced  it  to  a form  which  can  appeal  only  to 
the  “reasonable”,  or  rather  to  the  “reasoning”  man.  “In 
that  oratorical  work  which  he  called  The  Institutes” , M. 
Brunetiere  says,  “if  there  is  any  movement,  it  is  not  one 
which  comes  from  the  heart;  and — I am  speaking  here  only 
of  the  writer  or  the  religious  theorizer,  not  of  the  man — the 
insensibility  of  Calvin  is  equalled  only  by  the  rigor  of  his 
reasoning.”  The  religion  Calvin  sets  forth  is  “a  religion 
which  consists  essentially,  almost  exclusively,  in  the  adhe- 
sion of  the  intellect  to  truths  all  but  demonstrated”,  and 
commends  itself  by  nothing  “except  by  the  literalness  of  its 
agreement  with  a text — which  is  a matter  of  pure  philology 
— and  by  the  solidity  of  its  logical  edifice — which  is  noth- 
ing but  a matter  of  pure  reasoning.”  To  Calvin,  he  adds, 
“religious  truth  attests  itself  in  no  other  manner  and  by  no 
other  means  than  mathematical  truth.  As  he  would  reason 
on  the  properties  of  a triangle,  or  of  a sphere,  so  Calvin 
reasons  on  the  attributes  of  God.  All  that  will  not  adjust 
itself  to  the  exigencies  of  his  dialectic,  he  contests  or  he  re- 
jects . . . Cartesian  before  Descartes,  rational  evidence, 
logical  incontradiction  are  for  him  the  test  or  the  proof  of 
truth.  He  would  not  believe  if  faith  did  not  stay  itself  on 
a formal  syllogism.  . . . From  a 'matter  of  the  heart’,  if 
I may  so  say,  Calvin  transformed  religion  into  an  'affair  of 
the  intellect.’  ” 

We  must  not  fail  to  observe,  in  passing,  that  even  M. 
Brunetiere  refrains  from  attributing  to  Calvin’s  person  the 
hard  insensibility  which  he  represents  as  the  characteristic  of 
his  religious  writings, — a tribute,  we  may  suppose,  to  the 

relations  with  men ; and  it  is  by  the  heart  that  he  attains  to  complete 
union  of  man  with  God.”  For  a satisfactory  discussion  of  the  “heart  in 
Calvin’s  theology”  see  E.  Doumergue,  Jean  Calvin , etc.,  Ill  (1905),  PP- 
560-563.  Compare  also  the  third  address  in  Doumergue’s  L’Art  et  le 
Sentiment  dans  YOeuvre  de  Calvin,  Geneva,  1902. 

8 Discours  de  Combat,  1903,  pp.  135-140. 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


385 


religious  impression  which  is  made  by  Calvin’s  personality 
upon  all  who  come  into  his  presence,  and  which  led  even  M. 
Ernest  Renan,  who  otherwise  shares  very  largely  M.  Brune- 
tiere’s  estimate  of  him,  to  declare  him  “the  most  Christian 
man  of  his  age.”6  Nor  can  we  help  suspecting  that  the  vio- 
lence of  the  invectives  launched  against  the  remorseless  logic 
of  the  Institutes  and  of  Calvin’s  religious  reasoning  in  gene- 
ral, is  but  the  index  of  the  difficulty  felt  by  M.  Brunetiere 
and  those  who  share  his  point  of  view,  in  sustaining  them- 
selves against  the  force  of  Calvin’s  argumentative  presen- 
tation of  his  religious  conceptions.  It  is  surely  no  discredit 
to  a religious  reasoner  that  his  presentation  commends  his 
system  irresistibly  to  all  “reasonable”,  or  let  us  even  say 
“reasoning”  men.  A religious  system  which  cannot  sustain 
itself  in  the  presence  of  “reasonable”  or  “reasoning”  men, 
is  not  likely  to  remain  permanently  in  existence,  or  at  least 
in  power  among  reasonable  or  reasoning  men;  and  one 
would  think  that  the  logical  irresistibility  of  a system  of 
religious  truth  would  be  distinctly  a count  in  its  favor.  The 
bite  of  M.  Brunetiere’s  assault  is  found,  therefore,  purely  in 
its  negative  side . He  would  condemn  Calvin’s  system  of 
religion  as  nothing  but  a system  of  logic;  and  the  Institutes , 
the  most  systematic  presentation  of  it,  as  in  essence  nothing 
but  a congeries  of  syllogisms,  issuing  in  nothing  but  a set 
of  logical  propositions,  with  no  religious  quality  or  uplift 
in  them.  In  this,  however,  he  worst  of  all  misses  the  mark ; 
and  we  must  add  he  was  peculiarly  unfortunate  in  fixing, 
in  illustration  of  his  meaning,  on  the  two  matters  of  the 
'attributes  of  God’  as  the  point  of  departure  for  Calvin’s  dia- 
lectic and  of  the  intellectualizing  of  'faith’  as  the  height  of 
his  offending. 

'Etudes  d’histoire  religieuse,  ed.  7 (1880),  p.  342:  I’homme  le  plus 
chretien  de  son  siecle.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  is  not  very 
tiigh  praise  on  M.  Renan’s  lips ; and  was  indeed  intended  by  him  to  be 
depreciatory.  We  need  not  put  an  excessive  estimate  on  Calvin’s  great- 
ness, he  says  in  effect;  he  lived  in  an  age  of  reaction  towards  Christ- 
ianity and  he  was  the  most  Christian  man  of  his  age : his  preeminence 
is  thus  accounted  for. 

25 


386  THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 

In  Calvin’s  treatment  of  faith  there  is  nothing  more  strik- 
ing than  his  determination  to  make  it  clear  that  it  is  a 
matter  not  of  the  understanding  but  of  the  heart;  and  he  re- 
proaches the  Romish  conception  of  faith  precisely  because  it 
magnifies  the  intellectual  side  to  the  neglect  of  the  fiducial. 
“We  must  not  suppose”,  it  is  said  in  the  Confession  of  Faith 
drawn  up  for  the  Genevan  Church,7  either  by  himself  or 
by  his  colleagues  under  his  eye,  “that  Christian  faith  is  a 
naked  and  mere  knowledge  of  God  or  understanding  of  the 
Scriptures,  which  floats  in  the  brain  without  touching  the 
heart  . . . It  is  a firm  and  solid  confidence  of  the  heart.” 
Or,  as  he  repeats  this  elsewhere,8  “It  is  an  error  to  suppose 
that  faith  is  a naked  and  cold  knowledge.9  . . . Faith  is  not 
a naked  knowledge,10  which  floats  in  the  brain,  but  draws 
with  it  a living  affection  of  the  heart.”11  “True  Christian 
faith”,  he  expounds  in  the  second  edition  of  the  Institutes ,12 
. . . “ is  not  content  with  a simple  historical  knowledge, 
but  takes  its  seat  in  the  heart  of  man.”  “It  does  not  suffice 
that  the  understanding  should  be  illuminated  by  the  Spirit 
of  God  if  the  heart  be  not  strengthened  by  His  power.  In 
this  matter  the  theologians  of  the  Sorbonne  very  grossly  err, 
— thinking  that  faith  is  a simple  consent  to  the  Word  of 
God,  which  consists  in  understanding,  and  leaving  out  the 
confidence  and  assurance  of  the  heart.”  “What  the  under- 
standing has  received  must  be  planted  in  the  heart.  For 
if  the  Word  of  God  floats  in  the  head  only,  it  has  not  yet 
been  received  by  faith;  it  has  its  true  reception  only  when 
it  has  taken  root  in  the  depths  of  the  heart.”  Again,  to  cite 
a couple  of  passages  in  which  the  less  pungent  statement 

7 Instruction  et  Confession  de  Foy  dont  on  use  en  VEglise  du  Geneve 
(Opp.  xxii,  47).  The  Strassburg  editors  assign  it  to  Calvin’s  col- 
leagues; Doumergue  (Jean  Calvin,  II.  236-251)  to  Calvin. 

8 Vera  Christianae  pacificationis  et  ecclesiae  reformandae  ratio,  1549 
(Opp.  viii,  598-9). 

9 nudam  frigidamque  notitiam. 

10  nudam  notitiam. 

11  vivum  affectum  qy,i  cordi  insideat. 

12  Ed.  of  1539:  the  quotations  are  made  from  the  French  version  of 
1541,  pp.  189,  202,  204. 


Calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


387 


of  the  earlier  editions  has  been  given  new  point  and  force  in 
the  final  edition  of  the  Institutes:  “It  must  here  be  again 
observed,”  says  he,13  “that  we  are  invited  to  the  knowledge 
of  God — not  a knowledge  which,  content  with  empty  spec- 
ulation, floats  only  in  the  brain,  but  one  which  shall  be  solid 
and  fruitful,  if  rightly  received  by  us,  and  rooted  in  the 
heart.”  “The  assent  we  give  to  God”,  he  says  again,14  “as 
I have  already  indicated  and  shall  show  more  largely  later, — 
is  rather  of  the  heart  than  of  the  brain,  and  rather  of  the 
affections  than  of  the  understanding.”15  It  is  quite  clear, 
then,  that  Calvin  did  not  consciously  address  himself  merely 
to  the  securing  of  an  intellectual  assent  to  his  teaching,  but 
sought  to  move  men’s  hearts.  His  whole  conception  of  re- 
ligion turned,  indeed,  on  this : religion,  he  explained,  to  be 
pleasing  to  God,  must  be  a matter  of  the  heart,16  and  God 
requires  in  his  worshippers  precisely  heart  and  affection.”17 
All  the  arguments  in  the  world,  he  insists,  if  unaccompanied 
by  the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  on  the  heart,  will  fail  to  pro- 
duce the  faith  which  piety  requires.18 

This  scarcely  sounds  like  a man  to  whom  religion  was 
simply  a matter  of  logical  proof. 

And  so  far  is  he  from  making  the  attributes  of  God,  meta- 
physically determined,  the  starting-point  of  a body  of  teach- 
ing deduced  from  them  by  quasi-mathematical  reasoning, — 
as  one  would  deduce  the  properties  of  a triangle  from  its 
nature  as  a triangle, — that  it  has  been  made  his  reproach 
that  he  has  so  little  to  say  of  the  divine  nature  and  attri- 
butes, and  in  this  little  confines  himself  so  strictly  to  the 
manifest  indicia  of  God  in  His  works  and  the  direct  teach- 
ing of  Scripture,  refusing  utterly  to  follow  “the  high  priori” 
road  either  in  determining  the  divine  attributes  or  from 

13 1.  v.  9. 

14  III.  ii.  8. 

15  Cordis  esse  magis  quam  cerebri,  et  affectus  magis  quam  intelli- 
gentiae. 

18  fidem  et  veritatem  cordis. 

17  cor  et  animum  (Opp.  vi,  477,  479). 

18 1.  vii.  4. 


388 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


them  determining  the  divine  activities.  Thus,  his  doctrine 
of  God  is,  it  is  said,  no  doubt  notably  sober  and  restrained, 
but  also,  when  compared  with  Zwingli’s,  for  example,. — 
equally  notably  unimportant.19  It  is  confessed,  however, 
that  it  is  at  least  thoroughly  religious : and  in  this  is 
found,  indeed,  its  fundamental  characteristic.  Precisely 
where  Calvin’s  doctrine  differs  from  Zwingli’s  markedly  is 
that  he  constantly  contemplated  God  religiously,  while 
Zwingli  contemplated  him  philosophically — that  to  him  God 
was  above  and  before  all  things  the  object  of  religious  rev- 
erence, while  to  Zwingli  he  was  predominatingly  the  First 
Cause,  from  whom  all  things  proceed.20  “It  is  not  with  the 

19  Cf.  P.  J.  Muller,  De  Godsleer  van  Zwingli  en  Calvijn,  1883,  p.  hi  : 
“A  theologian  like  Calvin,  Zwingli  was  not;  but  still  in  the  history  of 
the  doctrine  of  God  the  pages  devoted  to  Zwingli  are  more  important 
than  those  devoted  to  Calvin.  The  loci  de  Trinitate,  de  Creation e,  and 
de  Lapso  apart,  Zwingli’s  system  is  undeniably  more  coherent  than  that 
of  Calvin,  in  which  we  miss  the  bond  by  which  the  several  parts  are 
joined.  On  the  other  side,  however,  we  miss  in  Zwingli’s  doctrine  of 
God  precisely  what  constitutes  the  value  of  a doctrine  of  God  for  the 
theologian,  that  is  to  say,  its  religious  character.  We  do  not  find  in 
Zwingli  as  in  Calvin  a recoil  from  the  consequences  of  his  own  reason- 
ing, which  leads  necessarily  to  the  ascription  to  God  of  the  origination 
of  evil,  or  sin,  just  because  God  is  not  with  him  as  with  Calvin  con- 
ceived above  everything  as  the  object  of  religious  reverence,  but  rather 
as  the  object  of  speculative  thought.” 

20  Cf.  P.  J .Muller,  De  Godsleer  van  Zwingli  en  Calvijn,  1883,  p.  6 : 
“If  the  doctrine  of  God  for  the  theologian  is  determined  by  its  religious 
character,  the  contemplation  of  God  as  the  object  of  religious  reverence 
will  take  a higher  place  with  him  than  the  merely  philosophical  contem- 
plation of  God  as  the  ultimate  cause.  Since  it  is  not  to  be  denied — as 
the  following  exposition  will  show, — that  with  Zwingli  God  is  specula- 
tively contemplated  much  more  as  the  ultimate  cause  than  as  the  object 
of  religious  reverence,  we  may  conclude  that — so  far  as  religious  value 
is  concerned — Zwingli’s  doctrine  of  God  must  be  ranked  below  Calvin’s.” 
Again  (p.  20)  : “In  the  nature  of  the  case  Calvin’s  conceptions  of  the 
nature  of  God  must  be  very  sober.  For  to  him,  God  was  very  pre- 
dominantly the  object  of  religious  reverence,  and  he  could  not  therefore 
do  otherwise  than  disapprove  of  the  attempt  to  penetrate  into  the 
nature  of  the  Godhead  (I.  v.  9)-  With  Zwingli,  on  the  contrary,  in 
whose  system  God  is  preeminently  conceived  as  the  ultimate  cause,  the 
doctrine  of  the  nature  of  God  must  form  one  of  the  most  important 
sections  of  the  doctrine  of  God.”  Once  more  (p.  23)  : “Calvin,  whose 
pride  it  was  to  be  a ‘biblical  theologian’,  does  not  follow  the  method 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


389 


doctrine  of  God”,  says  the  historian  whose  representations 
we  have  been  summarizing,  “but  with  the  worship  of  God 
that  Calvin’s  first  concern  was  engaged.  Even  in  his  doc- 
trine of  God' — as  we  may  perceive  from  his  remarks  upon 
it — religion  stands  ever  in  the  foreground  (I  ii.  1).  Before 
everything  else  Calvin  is  a religious  personality.  The  Refor- 
mation confronts  Catholicism  with  a zeal  to  live  for  God. 
With  striking  justice  Calvin  remarked  that  ‘all  alike  en- 
gaged in  the  worship  of  God,  but  few  really  reverenced 
Him, — that  there  was  everywhere  great  ostentation  in  cere- 
monies but  sincerity  of  heart  was  rare’  (I.  ii.  2).  Reverence 
for  God  was  the  great  thing  for  Calvin.  If  we  lose  sight 
of  this  a personality  like  Calvin  cannot  be  understood ; and 
it  is  only  by  recognizing  the  religious  principle  by  which  he 
was  governed,  that  a just  judgment  can  be  formed  of  his 
work  as  a dogmatician.  . . . ”21  Again,  Calvin  “considers 
the  knowledge  of  the  nature  and  of  the  attributes  of  God 
more  a matter  of  the  heart  than  of  the  understanding;  and 
such  a knowledge,  he  says,  must  not  only  arouse  us  to  ‘the 
service  of  God,  but  must  also  awake  in  us  the  hope  of  a 
future  life’  (I.  v.  10).  In  his  extreme  practicality — as  the 
last  remark  shows  us, — Calvin  rejected  the  philosophical 
treatment  of  the  question.  The  Scriptures,  for  him  the 
source  of  the  knowledge  of  God,  he  takes  as  his  guide  in  his 
remarks  on  the  attributes.  . . . ”22  Still  again,  “Already 
more  than  once  have  we  had  occasion  to  note  that  when 

of  the  philosophers, — the  aprioristic  method.  He  is  therefore  sober  in 
his  conceptions  of  the  nature  of  God,  since  he  had  noted  that  in  the 
Scriptures  God  speakes  little  of  His  nature,  that  He  may  teach  us 
sobriety” — quoting  I.  xiii.  1 : ut  nos  in  sobrietate  continuat,  parce  de 
sua  essentia  ( Deus j disserit. 

21  Cf.  P.  J.  Muller,  De  Godsleer  van  Calvijn,  1881,  p.  11 7. 

22  Cf.  P.  J.  Muller,  De  Godsleer  van  Zwingli  en  Calvijn,  1883,  p.  47. 
The  author  of  the  anonymous  Introduction  to  the  edition  of  the  Insti- 
tutes in  French,  published  by  Meyrueis  et  Cie,  Paris,  1859  (p.  xii),  says 
similarly : “Of  a mind  positive,  grave,  practical,  removed  from  all  need 
of  speculation,  very  circumspect,  not  expressing  its  thought  until  its 
conviction  had  attained  maturity,  taking  the  fact  of  a divine  revelation 
seriously,  Calvin  learned  his  faith  at  the  feet  of  the  Holy  Scrip- 
tures” . . . 


390 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


Calvin  treats  of  God,  he  does  this  as  a believer,  for  whom 
the  existence  of  God  stands  as  a fixed  fact;  and  what  he 
says  of  God,  he  draws  from  the  Scriptures  as  his  funda- 
mental source,  finding  his  pride  in  remaining  a biblical 
theologian,  and  whenever  he  can  taking  the  field  against  the 
philosophic o more  inter pretari  of  the  Scriptural  texts  (see 
e.  g.  I.  xvi.  3).  His  doctrine  of  God  has  the  practical  end 
of  serving  the  needs  of  his  fellow  believers.  It  is  also  note- 
worthy that  he  closes  every  stage  of  the  consideration  with 
an  exhortation  to  the  adoration  of  God  or  to  the  surrender 
of  the  heart  to  Him.  Of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  he 
declares  that  he  will  hold  himself  ever  truly  to  the  Scrip- 
tures, because  he  desires  to  do  nothing  more  than  to  make 
what  the  Scriptures  teach  accessible  to  our  conceptions 
planioribus  verbis,  and  this  will  apply  equally  to  the  whole 
of  his  doctrine  of  God.”23  In  a word,  nothing  can  be 
clearer  than  that  in  his  specific  doctrine  of  God  as  well  as 
in  his  general  attitude  to  religious  truth  Calvin  is  as  far 
as  possible  from  being  satisfied  with  a merely  logical  effect. 
When  we  listen  to  him  on  these  high  themes  we  are  listen- 
ing less  to  the  play  of  his  dialectic  than  to  the  throbbing  of 
his  heart. 

It  was  due  to  this  his  controlling  religious  purpose,  and 
to  his  dominating  religious  interest,  that  Calvin  was  able  to 
leave  the  great  topics  of  the  existence,  the  nature  and  the 
attributes  of  God,  without  formal  and  detailed  discussion  in 
his  Institutes.  It  is  only  a matter,  we  must  reiterate,  of  the 
omission  of  formal  and  detailed  discussion;  for  it  involves 
not  merely  a gross  exaggeration  but  a grave  misapprehen- 
sion to  represent  him  as  leaving  these  topics  wholly  to  one 
side,  and  much  more  to  seek  to  account  for  this  assumed 
fact  from  some  equally  assumed  peculiarity  of  Calvin’s 
theological  point  of  view  or  method.  Under  the  impulse 
of  his  governing  religious  interest,  he  was  able  to  content 
himself  with  such  an  exposition  of  the  nature  and  attributes 
of  God,  in  matter  and  form,  as  served  his  ends  of  religious 


P.  J.  Muller,  De  Godsleer  van  Calvijn,  etc.,  1881,  pp.  103-4. 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


39i 


impression,  and  was  under  no  compulsion  to  expand  this 
into  such  details  and  order  it  into  such  a methodical  mode 
of  presentation  as  would  satisfy  the  demands  of  scholastic 
treatment.  But  to  omit  what  would  be  for  his  purpose  ade- 
quate treatment  of  these  fundamental  elements  of  a com- 
plete doctrine  of  God  would  have  been  impossible,  we  do  not 
say  merely  to  a thinker  of  his  systematic  genius,  but  to  a 
religious  teacher  of  his  earnestness  of  spirit.  In  point  of 
fact,  we  do  not  find  lacking  to  the  Institutes  such  a funda- 
mental treatment  of  these  great  topics  as  would  be  appro- 
priate in  such  a treatise.  We  only  find  their  formal  and 
separate  treatment  lacking.  All  that  it  is  needful  for  the 
Christian  man  to  know  on  these  great  themes  is  here  pres- 
ent. Only,  it  is  present  so  to  speak  in  solution,  rather  than 
in  precipitate : distributed  through  the  general  discussion 
of  the  knowledge  of  God  rather  than  gathered  together  into 
one  place  and  apportioned  to  formal  rubrics.  It  is  commu- 
nicated moreover  in  a literary  and  concrete  rather  than  in  an 
abstract  and  scholastic  manner. 

It  will  repay  us  to  gather  out  from  their  matrix  in  the 
flowing  discourse  the  elements  of  Calvin’s  doctrine  of  God, 
that  we  may  form  some  fair  estimate  of  the  precise  nature 
and  amount  of  actual  instruction  he  gives  regarding  it.  We 
shall  attempt  this  by  considering  in  turn  Calvin’s  doctrine 
of  the  existence,  knowableness,  nature  and  attributes  of 
God. 

We  do  not  read  far  into  the  Institutes  before  we  find 
Calvin  presenting  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God.  It  is 
quite  true  that  this  book,  being  written  by  a Christian  for 
Christians,  rather  assumes  the  divine  existence  than  under- 
takes to  prove  it,  and  concerns  itself  with  the  so-called 
proofs  of  the  divine  existence  as  means  through  which  we 
rather  obtain  knowledge  of  what  God  is,  than  merely  attain 
to  knowledge  that  God  is.  But  this  only  renders  it  the 
more  significant  of  Calvin’s  attitude  towards  these  so-called 
proofs  that  he  repeatedly  lapses  in  his  discussion  from 
their  use  for  the  former  into  their  use  for  the  latter  and 


392 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


logically  prior  purpose.  That  he  thus  actually  presents  these 
proofs  as  evidences  specifically  of  the  existence  of  God  can 
admit  of  no  doubt.24 

If,  for  example,  he  adduces  that  sensus  deitatis  with 
which  all  men,  he  asserts,  are  natively  endowed,  primarily  as 
the  germ  which  may  be  developed  into  a profound  knowl- 
edge of  God,  he  yet  does  not  fail  explicitly  to  appeal  to  it 
also  as  the  source  of  an  ineradicable  conviction,  embedded 
in  the  very  structure  of  human  nature  and  therefore  present 
in  all  men  alike,  of  the  existence  of  God.  He  tells  us 
expressly  that  because  of  this  sensus  divinitatis,  present  in 
the  human  mind  by  natural  instinct,  all  men  without  excep- 

21  P.  J.  Muller’s  view  is  different,  as  may  be  seen  from  the  following 
extracts:  “Neither  by  Zwingli  nor  by  Calvin  are  there  offered  proofs 
of  the  existence  of  God,  although  there  are  particular  passages  in  their 
writings  which  seem  to  recall  them.  The  proposition  ‘That  God  exists’ 
needed  neither  for  themselves  nor  for  their  fellow-believers,  nor  even 
against  Rome,  any  proof.  It  has  been  thought  indeed  that  the  so-called 
cosmological  argument  is  found  in  Zwingli,  the  physico-theological  argu- 
ment in  Calvin  (Lipsius,  Lehrb.  der  ev.  prot.  Dogmatik,  ed.  2,  1879, 
p.  213).  But  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  show  that  in  the  case  of  neither 
have  we  to  do  with  a philosophical  deduction,  but  only  with  an  aid  for 
attaining  a complete  knowledge  of  God”  ( De  Godsleer  van  Z.  en  C., 
p.  11,  cf.  p.  14).  In  a note  Prof.  Muller  adverts  to  the  possible  use  by 
Calvin,  I.  iii.  i,  of  “the  so-called  historical  argument”.  “If  Zwingli 
gives  us  no  proof  of  God’s  existence,  the  same  is  true  of  Calvin.  It  is 
true  that  the  physico-theological  argument  has  been  discovered  in  the 
Institutes.  Yet  as  he  wrote  over  the  fifth  chapter  of  the  first  book: 
‘That  the  knowledge  of  God  is  manifested  in  the  making  and  continuous 
government  of  the  world’, — it  is  already  evident  from  this  that  he  did 
not  intend  to  argue  from  the  teleology  of  the  world  to  the  existence  of 
God  as  its  Creator,  Sustainer  and  Governor,  but  that  he  wished  merely 
to  point  to  the  world  as  to  ‘a  beautiful  book’, — to  speak  in  the  words  of 
our  (Netherlandish)  Confession  (Art.  II), — ‘in  which  all  creatures, 
small  and  great,  serve  as  letters  to  declare  to  us  the  invisible  things  of 
God’.  Here,  too,  we  have  accordingly  to  do  simply  with  a means  for 
a rise  to  a fuller  knowledge  of  God”  {Do.  p.  16).  “The  Scholastics 
may  indeed — although  answering  the  inquiry  affirmatively — begin  with 
the  question,  Is  there  a God?  Such  a question  cannot  rise  with  Calvin. 
The  Reformer,  assured  of  his  personal  salvation,  the  ground  of  which 
lay  in  God  Himself,  could  also  for  his  co-believers  leave  this  question 
to  one  side.  Practical  value  attached  only  to  the  inquiry  how  men 
can  come  to  know  God,  of  whose  existence  Calvin  entertained  no 
doubt”  {De  Godsleer  van  Calvijn , p.  11). 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


393 


tion  ( ad  unum  omnes)  know  (intelligant,  perceive,  under- 
stand) “that  God  exists”  ( Deum  esse),  and  are  therefore 
without  excuse  if  they  do  not  worship  Him  and  willingly 
consecrate  their  lives  to  Him  (I.  iii.  i).  It  is  to  buttress 
this  assertion  that  he  cites  with  approval  Cicero’s  declara- 
tion25 that  “there  is  no  nation  so  barbarous,  no  tribe  so 
savage,  that  there  is  not  stamped  on  it  the  conviction  that 
there  is  a God”.26  Thus  he  adduces  the  argument  of  the 
consensus  gentium — the  so-called  “historical”  argument, — 
with  exact  appreciation  of  its  true  bearing,  not  directly  as  a 
proof  of  the  existence  of  God,  but  directly  as  a proof  that 
the  conviction  of  the  divine  existence  is  a native  endowment 
of  human  nature,  and  only  through  that  indirectly  as  a 
proof  of  the  existence  of  God.  This  position  is  developed 
in  the  succeeding  paragraph  into  a distinct  anti-atheistic 
argument.  The  existence  of  religion,  he  says,  presupposes, 
and  cannot  be  accounted  for  except  by,  the  presence  in  man 
of  this  “constant  persuasion  of  God”  from  which  as  a seed 
the  propensity  to  religion  proceeds : men  may  deny  “that 
God  exists”,27  “but  will  they,  nill  they,  what  they  wish  not 
to  know  they  continually  are  aware  of”.28  It  is  a persuasion 
ingenerated  naturally  into  all,  that  “some  God  exists”29 
(I.  iii.  3),  and  therefore  this  does  not  need  to  be  inculcated  in 
the  schools,  but  every  man  is  from  the  womb  his  own  master 
in  this  learning,  and  cannot  by  any  means  forget  it.  It  is 
therefore  mere  detestable  madness  to  deny  that  “God  exists” 
(I.  iv.  2). 30  In  all  these  passages  Calvin  is  dealing  explic- 
itly, not  with  the  knowledge  of  what  God  is,  but  with  the 
knowledge  that  God  is.  It  is  quite  incontrovertible,  there- 
fore, that  he  grounds  an  argument — or  rather  the  argu- 
ment— for  the  existence  of  God  in  the  very  constitution  of 

25  ut  ethnicus  ille  ait:  the  allusion  is  to  Cicero,  de  natura  deorunt, 
I.  16. 

28  deum  esse. 

27  qui  Deum  esse  negent. 

28  velint  tamen  nolint,  quod  nescire  cupiunt,  subinde  sentiscunt. 

28  imo  et  naturaliter  ingenitam  esse  omnibus  hanc  persuasionem,  esse 
aliquem  Deum. 

80  negantes  Deum  esse. 


394  THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 

man.  The  existence  of  God  is,  in  other  words,  with  him 
an  “intuition”,  and  he  makes  this  quite  as  plain  as  if  he 
had  devoted  a separate  section  to  its  exposition. 

Similarly,  although  he  writes  at  the  head  of  the  chapter 
in  which  he  expounds  the  revelation  which  God  makes  of 
Himself  in  His  works  and  deeds : “That  the  knowledge  of 
God  is  manifested  in  the  making  of  the  world  and  its  con- 
tinuous government”  (ch.  v),  he  is  not  able  to  carry  through 
his  exposition  without  occasional  lapses  into  an  appeal  to 
the  patefaction  of  God  in  His  works  as  a proof  of  His 
existence,  rather  than  as  a revelation  of  His  nature.  The 
most  notable  of  these  lapses  occurs  in  the  course  of  his 
development  of  the  manifestation  of  God  made  by  the  na- 
ture of  man  himself  (I.  v.  4),  where  once  more  he  gives  us 
an  express  anti-atheistic  argument.  “Yea”,  he  cries,  “the 
earth  is  supporting  to-day  many  monstrous  beings,  who 
without  hesitation  employ  the  very  seed  of  divinity  which 
has  been  sown  in  human  nature  for  eclipsing  of  the  name  of 
God.  How  detestable,  I protest,  is  this  insanity,  that  a man% 
discovering  God  a hundred  times  in  his  body  and  soul, 
should  on  this  very  pretext  of  excellence  deny  that  God 
exists  !31  They  will  not  say  that  it  is  by  chance  that  they  are 
different  from  brute  beasts;  they  only  draw  over  God  the 
veil  of  ‘nature’,  which  they  declare  the  maker  of  all  things, 
and  thus  abolish  ( subducunt ) Him.  They  perceive  the  most 
exquisite  workmanship  in  all  their  members,  from  their 
countenances  and  eyes  to  their  very  finger-nails.  Here,  too, 
they  substitute  ‘nature’  in  the  place  of  God.  But  above  all 
how  agile  are  the  movements  of  the  soul,  how  noble  its 
faculties,  how  rare  its  gifts,  discovering  a divinity  which 
does  not  easily  permit  itself  to  be  concealed : unless  the 
Epicureans,  from  this  eminence,  should  like  the  Cyclops 
audaciously  make  war  against  God.  Is  it  true  that  all  the 
treasures  of  heavenly  wisdom  concur  for  the  government  of 
a worm  five  feet  long,  and  the  universe  lacks  this  preroga- 
tive? To  establish  the  existence  of  a kind  of  machinery  in 


81 Deum  esse  neget. 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


395 


the  soul,  correspondent  to  each  several  part  of  the  body, 
makes  so  little  to  the  obscuring  of  the  glory  of  God  that  it 
rather  illustrates  it.  Let  Epicurus  tell  what  concourse  of 
atoms  in  the  preparation  of  food  and  drink  distributes  part 
to  the  excrements,  part  to  the  blood,  and  brings  it  about 
that  the  several  members  perform  their  offices  with  as  much 
diligence  as  if  so  many  souls  by  common  consent  were  gov- 
erning one  body.”  “The  manifold  agility  of  the  soul”,  he 
eloquently  adds,  “by  which  it  surveys  the  heavens  and  the 
earth,  joins  the  past  to  the  future,  retains  in  memory  what 
it  once  has  heard,  figures  to  itself  whatever  it  chooses;  its 
ingenuity,  too,  by  which  it  excogitates  incredible  things  and 
which  is  the  mother  of  so  many  wonderful  arts ; are  certain 
insignia  in  man  of  divinity.  . . . Now  what  reason  exists 
that  man  should  be  of  divine  origin  and  not  acknowledge 
the  creator  ? Shall  we,  forsooth,  discriminate  between  right 
and  wrong  by  a judgment  which  has  been  given  to  us,  and 
yet  there  be  no  judge  in  heaven?  . . . Shall  we  be 

thought  the  inventors  of  so  many  useful  arts,  that  we  may 
defraud  God  of  his  praise  . . . although  experience 

sufficiently  teaches  us  that  all  that  we  have  is  distributed 
to  us  severally  from  elsewhere?  ...”  Calvin,  of 
course,  knows  that  he  is  digressing  in  a passage  like  this, — 
that  “his  present  business  is  not  with  that  sty  of  swine”,  as 
he  calls  the  Epicureans.  But  digression  or  not,  the  passage 
is  distinctly  an  employment  of  the  so-called  physico-theo- 
logical  proof  for  the  existence  of  God,  and  advises  us  that 
Calvin  held  that  argument  sound  and  would  certainly  em- 
ploy it  whenever  it  became  his  business  to  develop  the  argu- 
ments for  the  existence  of  God. 

The  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God  on  which  we  perceive 
Calvin  thus  to  rely  had  been  traditional  in  the  Church  from 
its  first  age.  It  was  precisely  upon  these  two  lines  of  argu- 
ment that  the  earliest  fathers  rested.  “He  who  knows  him- 
self”, says  Clement  of  Alexandria,  quite  in  Calvin’s  manner, 
“will  know  God.”32  “The  knowledge  of  God”,  exclaims 

82  Paed.  III.  i.  Cf.  Strom . V.  13;  Cohort,  vi. 


396  the  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 

Tertullian,  “is  the  dowry  of  the  soul.”33  “If  you  say,  ‘Show 
me  thy  God’,”  Theophilus  retorts  to  the  heathen  challenge, 
“I  reply,  ‘Show  me  your  man  and  I will  show  you  my 
God’.”34  The  God  who  cannot  be  seen  by  human  eyes, 
declares  Theophilus,35  “is  beheld  and  perceived  through  His 
providence  and  works”  : we  can  no  more  surely  infer  a pilot 
for  the  ship  we  see  making  straight  for  the  harbor,  than  we 
can  infer  a divine  governor  for  the  universe  tending  straight 
on  its  course.  “Those  who  deny  that  this  furniture  of  the 
whole  world  was  perfected  by  the  divine  reason”,  argues  the 
Octavius  of  Minucius  Felix,36  “and  assert  that  it  was  heaped 
together  by  certain  fragments  casually  adhering  to  each 
other,  seem  to  me  to  have  neither  mind,  nor  sense,  nor,  in 
fact,  even  sight  itself.”  “Whence  comes  it”,  &sks  Dionysius 
of  Alexandria,  criticizing  the  atomic  theory  quite  in  Cal- 
vin’s manner,37  that  the  starry  hosts — “this  multitude  of 
fellow-travellers,  all  unmarshalled  by  any  captain,  all  un- 
gifted with  any  determination  of  will,  and  all  unendowed 
with  any  knowledge  of  each  other,  have  nevertheless  held 
their  course  in  perfect  harmony?”  Like  these  early  fathers, 
Calvin  adduces  only  these  two  lines  of  evidence : the  exist- 
ence of  God  is  already  given  in  our  knowledge  of  self,  and 
it  is  solidly  attested  by  His  works  and  deeds.  Whether,  had 
we  from  him  a professed  instead  of  a merely  incidental 
treatment  of  the  topic,  the  metaphysical  arguments  would 
have  remained  lacking  in  his  case  as  in  theirs,38  we  can  only 

83  Adv.  Marc.  I.  10:  Cf.  De  Test.  Animae,  VI. 

34  Ad  Autol.  I.  2. 

36  Do.  I.  5. 

88  C.  xvii. 

87  Adv.  Epic.  iii. 

38  H.  C.  Sheldon,  History  of  Christian  Doctrine , vol.  1,  1886,  p.  56: 
“Metaphysical  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God,  such  as  those  adduced  by 
Augustine,  Anselm,  and  Descartes,  were  quite  foreign  to  the  theology 
of  the  first  three  centuries.”  But  in  the  next  age  they  had  already  come 
in;  cf.  Sheldon,  p.  187:  “We  find  a new  class  of  arguments,  something- 
more  in  the  line  of  the  metaphysical  than  anything  which  the  previous 
centuries  brought  forward.  Three  writers  in  particular  aspired  to  this 
order  of  proofs;  viz.,  Diodorus  of  Tarsus,  Augustine,  and  Boethius.” 
Augustine  is  the  real  father  of  the  ontological  argument:  but  Augus- 


CALVIN  S DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


397 


conjecture;  but  it  seems  very  possible  that  as  foreign  to  his 
a posteriori  method  ( cf . I.  v.  9)  they  lay  outside  of  his 
scheme  of  proofs.  Meanwhile,  he  has  in  point  of  fact 
adverted,  in  the  course  of  this  discussion,  only  to  the  two 
arguments  on  which  the  Church  teachers  at  large  had  de- 
pended from  the  beginning  of  Christianity.  He  states  these 
with  his  accustomed  clearness  and  force,  and  he  illuminates 
them  with  his  genius  for  exposition  and  illustration ; but  he 
gives  them  only  incidental  treatment  after  all.  In  richness 
as  well  as  in  fullness  of  presentation  he  is  surpassed  here 
by  Zwingli,39  and  it  is  to  Melanchthon  that  we  shall  have 
to  go  to  find  among  the  Reformers  a formal  enumeration  of 
the  proofs  for  the  divine  existence.40 

tine  only  chronologically  belonged  to  the  old  world ; as  Siebeck 
(ZPhP,  1868,  p.  190)  puts  it,  he  was  “the  first  modern  man”. 

“C/.  P.  J.  Muller,  De  Godsleer  van  Zwingli  en  Calvijn,  1883,  pp. 
1 1 -16,  where  a very  interesting  account  is  given  of  Zwingli’s  handling 
of  the  theistic  proofs — though  Prof.  Muller  thinks  that  Zwingli  employs 
them  not  to  establish  the  existence  of  God  but  to  increase  our  knowl- 
edge of  God.  With  Zwingli  all  knowledge  of  God  rests  at  bottom  on 
Revelation,  which  is  his  way  of  saying  what  Calvin  means  by  his  uni- 
versal sensus  deitatis.  Zwingli  says,  on  his  part,  that  “a  certain  seed 
of  knowledge  [of  God]  is  sown  [by  God]  also  among  the  Gentiles” 
(III.  158).  But  he  argues  with  great  force  and  in  very  striking 
language,  that  all  creation  proclaims  its  maker.  Cf.  A.  Baur,  Zwingli’s 
Theologie,  I.  382:  “In  the  doctrine  of  God,  Zwingli  distinguishes  two 
questions : first  that  of  the  nature,  and  secondly  that  of  the  existence  of 
God.  The  answer  to  the  first  question  surpasses  the  powers  of  the 
human  mind ; that  of  the  second,  does  not”.  That  the  knowledge  of  the 
existence  of  God,  which  “may  be  justified  before  the  understanding” 
(Muller,  p.  13),  does  not  involve  a knowledge  of  His  nature,  Zwingli 
holds  is  proved  by  the  wide  fact  of  polytheism  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
accompanying  fact,  on  the  other,  that  natural  theism  is  always  purely 
theoretical  (Baur,  p.  382). 

40  In  the  earliest  Loci  Communes  (1521)  there  was  no  locus  de  Deo 
at  all.  In  the  second  form  (1535-1541)  there  was  a locus  de  Deo,  but 
it  was  not  to  it  but  to  the  locus  de  Creatione  that  Melanchthon  appended 
some  arguments  for  the  existence  of  God,  remarking  (C.  R.  xxi,  p. 
369)  : “After  the  mind  has  been  confirmed  in  the  true  and  right 
opinion  of  God  and  of  Creation  by  the  Word  of  God  itself,  it  is  then 
both  useful  and  pleasant  to  seek  out  also  the  vestiges  of  God  in  nature 
and  to  collect  the  arguments  ( rationes ) which  testify  that  there  is  a 
God.”  These  remarks  are  expanded  in  the  final  form  (1543+)  and 
reduced  to  a formal  order,  for  the  benefit  of  “good  morals”.  The  list 


398 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


That  this  God,  the  conviction  of  whose  existence  is  part 
of  the  very  constitution  of  the  human  mind  and  is  justified 
by  abundant  manifestations  of  Himself  in  His  works  and 
deeds,  is  knowable  by  man,  lies  on  the  face  of  Calvin’s  entire 
discussion.  The  whole  argument  of  the  opening  chapters 
of  the  Institutes  is  directed  precisely  to  the  establishment  of 
this  knowledge  of  God  on  an  irrefragable  basis:  and  the 
emphasis  with  which  the  reality  and  trustworthiness  of  our 
knowledge  of  God  is  asserted  is  equalled  only  by  the  skill 
with  which  the  development  of  our  native  instinct  to  know 
God  into  an  actual  knowledge  of  Him  is  traced  (in  ch.  i), 
and  the  richness  with  which  His  revelation  of  Himself  in 
His  works  and  deeds  is  illustrated  by  well-chosen  and  strik- 
ingly elaborated  instances  (in  ch.  5).  Of  course,  Calvin 
does  not  teach  that  sinful  man  can  of  himself  attain  to  the 
knowledge  of  God.  The  noetic  effects  of  sin  he  takes  very 
seriously,  and  he  teaches  without  ambiguity  that  all  men 
have  grossly  degenerated  from  the  true  knowledge  of  God 
(ch.  iv).  But  this  is  not  a doctrine  of  the  unknowableness  of 

consists  of  nine  “demonstrations,  the  consideration  of  which  is  useful 
for  discipline  and  for  confirming  honest  opinions  in  minds”.  “The  first 
is  drawn  from  the  order  of  nature  itself,  that  is  from  the  effects  arguing 
a maker.  . . . The  second,  from  the  nature  of  the  human  mind. 

A brute  thing  is  not  the  cause  of  an  intelligent  nature.  . . . The  third, 
from  the  distinction  between  good  and  evil  . . . and  the  sense  of 

order  and  number.  . . . Fourthly : natural  ideas  are  true : that  there 
is  a God,  all  confess  naturally : therefore  this  idea  is  true.  . . . The 
fifth  is  taken,  in  Xenophanes,  from  the  terrors  of  conscience.  . . . 

The  sixth  from  political  society.  . . . The  seventh  is  . . . drawn 
from  the  series  of  efficient  causes.  There  cannot  be  an  infinite  recession 
of  efficient  causes.  . . . The  eighth  from  final  causes.  . . . The 
ninth  from  prediction  of  future  events.”  “These  arguments”,  he  adds, 
“not  only  testify  that  there  is  a God,  but  are  also  indicia  of  providence. 
. . . They  are  perspicuous  and  always  affect  good  minds.  Many 

others  also  could  certainly  be  collected;  but  because  they  are  more 
obscure,  I leave  off.”  . . . G.  H.  Lamers,  Geschiedenis  der  Leer 

aangande  God , 1897,  p.  179  [687],  remarks:  “It  should  be  noted  that 
Melanchthon  always  when  speaking  of  God,  whether  as  Spirit  or  as 
Love,  wishes  everywhere  to  ascribe  the  highest  value  to  God’s  ethical 
characteristics.  Even  the  particulars,  nine  in  number,  to  which  he 
(Doedes,  Inleiding  tot  der  Leer  van  God,  p.  191)  points  as  proofs  that 
God’s  existence  must  be  recognized,  show  that  ethical  considerations 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


399 


God,  but  rather  of  the  incapacitating  effects  of  sin.  Accord- 
ingly he  teaches  that  the  inadequateness  of  the  knowledge 
of  God  to  which  alone  sinners  can  attain  is  itself  a sin. 
Men’s  natures  prepare  them  to  serve  God,  God’s  revelations 
of  Himself  display  Him  before  men’s  eyes : if  men  do  not 
know  God  they  are  without  excuse  and  cannot  plead  their 
inculpating  sinfulness  as  exculpation.  God  remains,  then, 
knowable  to  normal  man : it  is  natural  to  man  to  know  Him. 
And  if  in  point  of  fact  He  cannot  be  known  save  by  a super- 
natural action  of  the  Holy  Spirit  on  the  heart,  this  is  because 
man  is  not  in  his  normal  state  and  it  requires  this  supernat- 
ural action  of  the  Spirit  on  his  heart  to  restore  him  to  his 
proper  natural  powers  as  man.  The  “testimony  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  in  the  heart”  does  not  communicate  to  man  any  new 
powers,  powers  alien  to  him  as  man : it  is  restorative  in  its 
nature  and  in  principle  merely  recovers  his  powers  from  their 
deadness  induced  by  sin.  The  knowledge  of  God  to  which 
man  attains  through  the  testimony  of  the  Spirit  is  therefore 
the  knowledge  which  belongs  to  him  as  normal  man:  al- 

especially  attract  him.”  More  justly  Herrlinger,  Die  Theologie  Me- 
lanchthons,  1879,  comments  on  Melanchthon’s  use  of  the  “proofs”  as 
follows : “The  natural  knowledge  of  God,  resting  on  an  innate  idea 
and  awakened  especially  by  teleological  contemplation  of  the  world, 
Melanchthon  makes  in  his  philosophical  writings,  particularly  in  his 
physics,  the  object  of  consideration,  so  that  we  may  speak  of  the  ele- 
ments of  a natural  theology  in  him”  (p.  168).  Melanchthon  heaps  up 
these  arguments,  enumerating  nine  of  them,  in  the  conviction  J;hat  they 
will  mutually  strengthen  one  another.  Herrlinger  thinks  that,  as  they 
occur  in  much  the  same  order  in  more  of  Melanchthon’s  writings  than 
one,  they  may  be  arranged  on  some  principle, — possibly  beginning 
with  particulars  in  nature  and  man,  proceeding  to  human  association, 
and  rising  to  the  entirety  of  nature  (p.  393).  He  continues  (p.  393)  : 
“Clearly  enough  it  is  the  teleological  argument  which  in  all  these  proofs 
is  the  real  nerve  of  the  proof.  Melanchthon  accords  with  Kant  as  in 
the  high  place  he  gives  this  proof,  so  also  in  perceiving  that  all  these 
proofs  find  their  strength  in  the  ontological  argument,  in  the  innate  idea 
of  God,  which  is  the  most  direct  witness  for  God’s  existence.  15.  564; 
‘The  mind  reasons  of  God  from  a multitude  of  vestiges.  But  this 
reasoning  would  not  be  made  if  there  were  not  infused  ( insita ) into  the 
mind  a certain  knowledge  ( notitia ) or  71736X77^5  of  God’.  Similarly,  De 
Anima,  13.  144.  169.”  The  relation  of  the  proofs  to  the  innate  sensus 
deitatis  here  indicated,  holds  good  also  for  Calvin. 


400 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


though  now  secured  by  him  only  in  a supernatural  manner, 
it  is  in  kind,  and,  so  far  as  it  is  the  product  of  his  innate 
sensus  deitatis  and  the  revelation  of  God  in  His  works  and 
deeds,  it  is  in  mode  also,  natural  knowledge  of  God.  Calvin’s 
doctrine  of  the  noetic  effects  of  sin  and  their  removal  by  the 
“testimony  of  the  Spirit”,  that  is  to  say,  by  what  we  call 
“regeneration”,  must  not  then  be  taken  as  a doctrine  of  the 
unknowableness  of  God.  On  the  contrary  it  is  a doctrine  of 
the  knowableness  of  God,  and  supplies  only  an  account  of 
why  men  in  their  present  condition  fail  to  know  Him,  and  an 
exposition  of  how  and  in  what  conditions  the  knowableness 
of  God  may  manifest  itself  in  man  as  now  constituted  in 
an  actually  known  God.  When  the  Spirit  of  God  enters  the 
heart  with  recreative  power,  he  says,  then  even  sinful  man, 
his  blurred  eyes  opened,  may  see  God,  not  merely  that  there 
is  a God,  but  what  kind  of  Being  this  God  is  (I.  i.  i ; ii.  i ; 

V.  I). 

Of  course,  Calvin  does  not  mean  that  God  can  be  known 
to  perfection,  whether  by  renewed  man,  or  by  sinless  man 
with  all  his  native  powers  uninjured  by  sin.  In  the  depths 
of  His  being  God  is  to  him  past  finding  out ; the  human  intel- 
ligence has  no  plumbet  to  sound  those  profound  deeps.  “His 
essense”  {essentia),  he  says,  “is  incomprehensible  ( incom - 
prehensibilis ) ; so  that  His  divinity  (numen)  wholly  escapes 
all  human  senses”  (I.  v.  i,  cf.  I.  xi.  3);  and  though  His 
works  and  the  signs  by  which  He  manifests  Himself  may 
“admonish  men  of  His  incomprehensible  essense”  (I.  xi.  3), 
yet,  being  men,  we  are  not  capax  Dei;  as  Augustine  says 
somewhere,  we  stand  disheartened  before  His  greatness  and 
are  unable  to  take  Him  in  (I.  v.  9). 41  We  can  know  then 
only  God’s  glory  (I.  v.  1),  that  is  to  say,  His  manifested 
perfections  (I.  v.  9),  by  which  what  He  is  to  us  is  revealed 
to  us  (I.  x.  2).  What  He  is  in  Himself,  we  cannot  know, 
and  all  attempts  to  penetrate  into  His  essense  are  but  cold 
and  frigid  speculations  which  can  lead  to  no  useful  knowl- 

41  In  Psalmos,  144:  ilium  non  possumus  capere,  velut  sub  ejus  magni- 
tudine  deficientes. 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


401 


edge.  “They  are  merely  toying  with  frigid  speculations”, 
he  says  (I.  ii.  2),  “whose  mind  is  set  on  the  question  of  what 
God  is  ( quid  sit  Dens),  when  what  it  really  concerns  us  to 
know  is  rather  what  kind  of  a person  He  is  ( qualis  sit)  and 
what  is  appropriate  to  His  nature  ( natura )”  (I.  ii.  2). 42 
We  are  to  seek  God,  therefore,  “not  with  audacious  inquisi- 
tiveness by  attempting  to  search  into  His  essence  ( essentia ), 
which  is  rather  to  be  adored  than  curiously  investigated; 
but  by  contemplating  Him  in  His  works,  in  which  He  brings 
Himself  near  to  us  and  makes  Himself  familiar  and  in  some 
measure  communicates  Himself  to  us”  (I.  v.  9).  For  if  we 
seek  to  know  what  He  is  in  Himself  ( quis  sit  apud  se) 
rather  than  what  kind  of  a person  He  is  to  us  ( qualis  erga 
nos), — which  is  revealed  to  us  in  His  attributes  ( virtutes ) — 
we  simply  lose  ourselves  in  empty  and  meteoric  speculation 
(I.  X.  2). 

The  distinction  which  Calvin  is  here  drawing  between 
the  knowledge  of  the  quid  and  the  knowledge  of  the  qualis 
of  God;  the  knowledge  of  what  He  is  in  Himself  and 
the  knowledge  of  what  He  is  to  us,  is  the  ordinary  scho- 
lastic one  and  fairly  repeats  what  Thomas  Aquinas  contends 
for  ( Summa  Theol.  I,  qu.  12,  art.  12),  when  he  tells  us  that 
there  is  no  knowledge  of  God  per  essentiam , no  knowledge 
of  His  nature,  of  His  quidditas  per  speciem  pro priam;  but 
we  know  only  habitudinem  ipsius  ad  creaturas.  There  is  no 
implication  of  nominalism  here ; nothing,  for  example,  sim- 
ilar to  Occam’s  declaration  that  we  can  know  neither  the 
divine  essence,  nor  the  divine  quiddity,  nor  anything  intrin- 
sic to  God,  nor  anything  that  God  is  realiter.  When  Calvin 
says  that  the  Divine  attributes  describe  not  what  God  is 
apud  se , but  what  kind  of  a person  He  is  erga  nos,43  he  is 

“We  cannot  know  the  quiddity  of  God:  we  can  only  know  His 
quality:  that  is  to  say  what  His  essence  is  is  beyond  our  comprehension, 
but  we  may  know  Him  in  His  attributes. 

43  Cf.  the  passage  in  ed.  2 and  other  middle  editions  in  which,  refuting 
the  Sabellians,  he  says  that  such  attributes  as  strength,  goodness,  wis- 
dom, mercy,  are  “epithets”  which  “show  qualis  erga  nos  sit  Deus”, 
while  the  personal  names,  Father,  Son,  Spirit,  are  “names”  which 
“declare  qualis  apud  semetipsum  vere  sit”  (Opp.  I.  491). 

26 


402 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


not  intending  to  deny  that  His  attributes  are  true  determina- 
tions of  the  divine  nature  and  truly  reveal  to  us  the  kind 
of  a person  He  is ; he  is  only  refusing  to  speculate  on  what 
God  is  apart  from  His  attributes  by  which  He  reveals  Him- 
self to  us,  and  insisting  that  it  is  only  in  these  attributes  that 
we  know  Him  at  all.  He  is  refusing  all  a priori  methods 
of  determining  the  nature  of  God  and  requiring  of  us  to 
form  our  knowledge  of  Him  a posteriori  from  the  revelation 
He  gives  us  of  Himself  in  His  activities.  This  He  insists  is 
the  only  knowledge  we  can  have  of  God,  and  this  the  only 
way  we  can  attain  to  any  knowledge  of  Him  at  all.  Of 
what  value  is  it  to  us,  he  asks  (I.  v.  9),  to  imagine  a God 
of  whose  working  we  have  had  no  experience?  Such  a 
knowledge  only  floats  in  the  brain  as  an  empty  speculation. 
It  is  by  His  attributes  ( virtutes ) that  God  is  manifested;  it 
is  only  through  them  that  we  can  acquire  a solid  and  fruitful 
knowledge  of  Him.  The  only  right  way  and  suitable 
method  of  seeking  Him,  accordingly,  is  through  His  works, 
in  which  He  draws  near  to  us  and  familiarizes  Himself  to 
us  and  in  some  degree  communicates  Himself  to  us.  Here 
is  not  an  assertion  that  we  learn  nothing  of  God  through 
His  attributes,  which  represent  only  determinations  of  our 
own.  On  the  contrary,  here  is  an  assertion  that  we  obtain 
through  the  attributes  a solid  and  fruitful  knowledge  of 
God.  Only  it  is  not  pretended  that  the  attributes  of  God  as 
revealed  in  His  activities  tell  us  all  that  God  is,  or  anything 
that  He  is  in  Himself : they  only  tell  us,  in  the  nature  of 
the  case,  what  He  is  to  us.  Fortunately,  says  Calvin,  this  is 
what  we  need  to  know  concerning  God,  and  we  may  well 
eschew  all  speculation  concerning  His  intrinsic  nature  and 
content  ourselves  with  knowing  what  He  is  in  His  relation 
to  His  creatures.  His  object  is,  not  to  deny  that  God  is 
what  He  seems, — that  His  attributes  revealed  in  His  deal- 
ings with  His  creatures  represent  true  determination  of  His 
nature.  His  object  is  to  affirm  that  these  determinations, 
of  His  nature,  revealed  in  His  dealings  with  His  creatures, 
constitute  the  sum  of  our  real  knowledge  of  God : and  that 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


403 


apart  from  them  speculation  will  lead  to  no  solid  results. 
He  is  calling  us  back,  not  from  a fancied  knowledge  of  God 
through  His  activities  to  the  recognition  that  we  know 
nothing  of  Him,  that  what  we  call  His  attributes  are  only 
effects  in  us : but  from  an  a priori  construction  of  an  imag- 
inary deity  to  an  a posteriori  knowledge  of  the  Deity  which 
really  is  and  really  acts.  This  much  we  know,  he  says,  that 
God  is  what  His  works  and  acts  reveal  Him  to  be : though 
it  must  be  admitted  that  His  works  and  acts  reveal  not  His 
metaphysical  Being  but  His  personal  relations, — not  what 
He  is  apud  se,  but  what  He  is  quoad  nos . 

Of  the  nature  of  God  in  the  abstract  sense,  thus, — the 
quiddity  of  God,  in  scholastic  phrase — Calvin  has  little  to 
say.44  But  his  refusal  to  go  behind  the  attributes  which 

44  Cf.  P.  J.  Muller,  De  Godsleer  van  Calvijn,  p.  26 : “A  doctrine  of  the 
nature  of  God  as  such  we  do  not  find  in  Calvin.”  To  teach  us  modesty, 
Calvin  says,  God  says  little  of  His  nature  in  Scripture,  but  to  teach  us 
what  we  ought  to  know  of  Him  he  gives  us  two  epithets — immensity 
and  spirituality  (p.  29).  Again,  De  Godsleer  van  Zwingli  en  Calvijn, 
pp.  30-31:  “The  little  that  Calvin  gives  us  on  this  subject  (the  Divine 
Essence)  limits  itself  to  the  remark  that  God’s  essence  is  ‘immense  and 
spiritual’  (I.  xiii.  1),  ‘incomprehensible  to  us’  (I.  v.  1).”  Again,  p.  38: 
“If  the  aprioristic  method  [as  employed  by  Zwingli]  is  thus  not  favor- 
able to  the  development  of  a doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  Calvin’s  aposterior- 
istic  method  is  on  the  other  hand  the  reason  that  his  conceptions  of  the 
nature  of  God — apart  from  the  Trinity — are  of  less  significance  than 
Zwingli’s.  Since  our  understanding,  according  to  Calvin,  is  incapable 
of  grasping  what  God  is,  it  is  folly  to  seek  with  arrogant  curiosity  to- 
investigate  God’s  nature,  ‘which  is  much  rather  to  be  adored  than 
anxiously  to  be  inquired  into’  (On  Romans  i.  19:  ‘They  are  mad  who 
seek  to  discover  what  God  is’;  Institutes  I.  ii.  2:  ‘The  essence  of  God 
is  rather  to  be  adored  than  inquired  into’).  If  we  nevertheless  wish 
to  solve  the  problem  up  to  a certain  point,  let  this  be  done  only  by 
means  of  the  Scriptures  in  which  God  has  revealed  His  nature  to  us 
so  far  as  it  is  needful  for  us  to  know  it.  The  warning  he  gives  us  is 
therefore  certainly  fully  comprehensible, — that  ‘those  who  devote  them- 
selves to  the  solving  of  the  problem  of  what  God  is  should  hold  their 
speculations  within  bounds ; since  it  is  of  much  more  importance  for  us 
to  know  what  kind  of  a being  God  is’  (I.  ii.  2).  How  can  a man  who 
cannot  understand  his  own  nature  be  able  to  comprehend  God’s  nature  ? 
Let  us  then  leave  to  God  the  knowledge  of  Himself:  and — so  Calvin 
says — ‘we  leave  it  to  Him  when  we  conceive  Him  as  He  has  revealed 
Himself  to  us,  and  when  we  seek  to  inquire  with  reference  to  Him, 
nowhere  else  than  in  His  Word’  (I.  xiii.  21)  ...” 


404 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


are  revealed  to  us  in  God’s  works  and  deeds,  affords  no  justi- 
fication to  us  for  going  behind  them  for  him  and  attributing 
to  him  against  his  protest  developed  conceptions  of  the 
nature  of  the  divine  essence,  which  he  vigorously  repudi- 
ates. Calvin  has  suffered  more  than  most  men  from  such 
gratuitous  attributions  to  him  of  doctrines  which  he  emphat- 
ically disclaims.  Thus,  not  only  has  it  been  persistently 
asserted  that  he  reduced  God,  after  the  manner  of  the  Scot- 
ists,  to  the  bare  notion  of  arbitrary  Will,  without  ethical 
content  or  determination,45  but  the  contradictory  concep- 

45  This  is  fast  becoming  the  popular  representation.  Cf.  e.  g.  Wil- 
listora  Walker,  John  Calvin,  1906,  p.  149:  “Thus  he  owed  to  Scotus, 
doubtless  without  realizing  the  obligation,  the  thought  of  God  as 
almighty  will,  for  motives  behind  whose  choice  it  is  as  absurd  as  it 
is  impious  to  inquire.”  Again,  p.  418:  “Whether  this  Scotist  doctrine 
of  the  rightfulness  of  all  that  God  wills  by  the  mere  fact  of  His  willing 
it,  leaves  God  a moral  character,  it  is  perhaps  useless  to  inquire.”  But 
Calvin  does  not  borrow  unconsciously  from  Scotus : he  openly  repu- 
diates Scotus.  And  Calvin  is  so  far  from  representing  the  will  of  God 
to  be  independent  of  His  moral  character,  that  he  makes  it  merely  the 
expression  of  His  moral  character,  and  only  inscrutable  to  us.  Cf. 
also  C.  H.  Irwin,  John  Calvin,  1909,  p.  179:  “Holding  as  he  did  the 
theory  of  Duns  Scotus,  that  a thing  is  right  by  the  mere  fact  of  God 
willing  it,  he  never  questioned  whether  a course  was  or  was  not  in 
harmony  with  the  Divine  character,  if  he  was  once  convinced  that  it 
was  a course  attributed  to  God  in  Scripture.”  But  Calvin  did  not  hold 
that  a thing  is  made  right  by  the  mere  fact  that  God  wills  it  but  that  the 
fact  that  God  wills  it  (which  fact  Scripture  may  witness  to  us)  is  proof 
enough  to  us  that  it  is  right.  The  vogue  of  this  remarkable  misrepresen- 
tation of  Calvin’s  doctrine  of  God  is  doubtless  due  to  its  enunciation 
(though  in  a somewhat  more  guarded  form)  by  Ritschl  ( Jahrbb . fur 
deutsche  Theologie , 1868,  xiii,  pp.  104  sq.).  Ritschl’s  fundamental  con- 
tention is  that  the  Nominalistic  conception  of  God,  crowded  out  of  the 
Roman  Church  by  Thomism,  yet  survived  in  Luther’s  doctrine  of  the 
enslaved  will  and  Calvin’s  doctrine  of  twofold  predestination  (p.  68), 
which  presuppose  the  idea  of  “the  groundless  arbitrariness  of  God”  in 
His  actions.  Calvin  was  far  from  adopting  this  principle  in  theory  or 
applying  it  consistently.  He  is  aware  of  and  seeks  to  guard  against  its 
dangers  (p.  106)  ; but  his  doctrine  of  a double  predestination  (in 
Ritschl’s  opinion)  proceeds  on  its  assumption : “In  spite  of  Calvin’s 
reluctance,  we  must  judge  that  the  idea  of  God  which  governs  this  doc- 
trine comes  to  the  same  thing  as  the  Nominalistic  potentia  ahsoluta”  (p. 
107).  The  same  line  of  reasoning  may  be  read  also  in  Seeberg,  Text- 
Book  of  the  History  of \ Doctrines,  § 79,  4 (E.  T.  11.  397),  who  also  is 
compelled  to  admit  that  this  conception  of  God  is  both  repudiated  by 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


405' 


tions  of  a virtual  Deism46  and  a developed  Pantheism47  have 
with  equal  confidence  been  attributed  to  him.  To  instance 
but  a single  example,  Principal  A.  M.  Fairbairn  permits 
himself  to  say  that  “Calvin  was  as  pure,  though  not  as  con- 
scious and  consistent  a Pantheist  as  Spinoza”.48  Astonish- 
ing as  such  a declaration  is  in  itself,  it  becomes  more  aston- 

Calvin  and  is  destructive  of  his  “logical  structure” ! For  a sufficient 
refutation  of  this  whole  notion  see  Max  Scheibe’s  Calvin’s  Prddestina- 
tionslehre,  pp.  113  sq.  “Calvin”,  says  Scheibe,  “could  therefore  very 
properly  repudiate  the  charge  of  proceeding  on  the  Scoto-nominalistic 
idea  of  the  potentia  absoluta  of  God.  . . . With  Calvin,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  conception  of  the  will  of  God  as  the  highest  causality  has  the 
particular  meaning  that  God  is  not  determined  in  His  actions  by  any- 
thing lying  outside  of  Himself,  . . . while  it  is  distinctly  not  excluded 
that  God  acts  by  virtue  of  an  inner  necessity,  accordant  with  His  nature.” 

48  Cf.  e.g.  A.  V.  G.  Allen,  The  Continuity  of  Christian  Thought  (1884), 
p.  299 : “The  God  who  is  thus  revealed  is  a being  outside  the  frame- 
work of  the  universe,  who  called  the  world  into  existence  by  the  power 
of  His  will.  Calvin  positively  rejected  the  doctrine  of  the  divine 
immanence.  When  he  spoke  of  that  ‘dog  of  a Lucretius’  who  mingles 
God  and  nature,  he  may  have  also  had  Zwingli  in  his  mind.  In  order 
to  separate  more  completely  between  God  and  man,  he  interposed 
ranks  of  mediators.  ...”  Also,  p.  302:  “In  some  respects  the 
system  of  Calvin  not  merely  repeats  but  exaggerates  the  leading  ideas 
of  Latin  Christianity.  In  no  Latin  writer  is  found  such  a determined 
purpose  to  reject  the  immanence  of  Deity  and  assert  His  transcendence 
and  His  isolation  from  the  world.  In  his  conception  of  God,  as  absolute, 
arbitrary  will,  he  surpasses  Duns  Scotus.  . . . The  separation  be- 

tween God  and  humanity  is  emphasized  as  it  has  never  been  before,  for 
Calvin  insists,  dogmatically  and  formally,  upon  that  which  had  been,  to 
a large  extent,  hitherto,  an  unconscious  though  controlling  sentiment.” 
Prof.  Allen  had  already  represented  the  Augustinian  theology  as 
“resting  upon  the  transcendence  of  Deity  as  its  controlling  principle”, — 
which  he  explains  as  a tacit  “assumption  of  Deism”  (pp.  5,  191). 

4T  Cf.  Principal  D.  W.  Simon,  Reconciliation  by  Incarnation,  p.  282, 
where  he  speaks  of  “the  Pantheism  . . . with  which  Calvin  is  log- 

ically chargeable — strongly  as  he  might  resent  the  imputation — when  he 
says:  ‘Nothing  happens  but  what  He  has  knowingly  and  willingly 
decreed’ ; ‘All  the  changes  which  take  place  in  the  world  are  produced 
by  the  secret  agency  of  the  hand  of  God’;  ‘Not  heaven  and  earth  and 
inanimate  creatures  only,  but  also  the  counsels  and  wills  of  men  are 
so  governed  as  to  move  exactly  in  the  course  which  He  has  destined.” 
To  Dr.  Simon  providential  government  of  the  world  implies  pantheism! 

48  The  Place  of  Christ  in  Modern  Theology,  1893,  P-  164.  Even  H.  M. 
Gwatkin,  The  Knowledge  of  God,  etc.,  1906,  II.  226,  having  spoken  of 
Calvin  as  “taking  over  from  the  Scotists”  his  conception  of  God  as 


406 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


ishing  still  when  we  observe  the  ground  on  which  it  is  based. 
This  consists  essentially  in  the  discovery  that  the  funda- 
mental conception  of  Calvinism  is  that  “God’s  is  the  only 
efficient  will  in  the  universe,  and  so  He  is  the  one  ultimate 
causal  reality”,49 — upon  which  the  certainly  very  true  re- 
mark is  made  that  “the  universalized  Divine  will  is  an  even 
more  decisive  and  comprehensive  Pantheism  than  the  uni- 
versalized Divine  substance”.50  The  logical  process  by 
which  the  Calvinistic  conception  of  the  sovereign  will  of 
God  as  the  prima  causa  rerum — where  the  very  term  prima 
implies  the  existence  and  reality  of  “second  causes” — is 
transmuted  into  the  Pantheising  notion  that  the  will  of  God 
is  the  sole  efficient  cause  operative  in  the  universe;  or  by 
which  the  Calvinistic  conception  of  God  as  the  sovereign 
ruler  of  the  universe  whose  “will  is  the  necessity  of  things” 
is  transmuted  into  the  reduction  of  God,  Hegelian-wise,  into 
pure  and  naked  will,51 — although  it  has  apparently  appealed 
to  many,  is  certainly  very  obscure.  In  point  of  fact,  when 
the  Calvinist  spoke  of  God  as  the  prima  causa  rerum — the 
phrase  is  cited  from  William  Ames52 — he  meant  by  it  only 
that  all  that  takes  place  takes  place  in  accordance  with  the 
divine  will,  not  that  the  divine  will  is  the  only  efficient 
cause  in  the  universe;  and  when  Calvin  quotes  approvingly 

“sovereign  and  inscrutable  will”,  adds  that  he  needed  only  to  suppose 
further  that  “the  divine  will”  is  “necessitated  as  well  as  inscrutable”  to 
have  taught  a Pantheistic  system.  But  as  he  thus  allows  Calvin  did 
not  suppose  this,  and  had  just  pointed  out  that  Calvin  explains  that 
God  is  not  an  “absolute  and  arbitrary  power”,  we  probably  need  not 
look  upon  this  language  as  other  than  rhetorical : it  certainly  is  not  true 
to  the  facts  in  either  of  its  members. 

49  P.  164.  Cf.  p.  430.  It  is  Amesius  to  whom  Dr.  Fairbairn  appeals 
to  justify  this  statement:  but  he  misinterprets  Amesius. 

50  P.  168. 

61  Cf.  Baur,  Die  christliche  Lehre  von  d.  Dreieinigkeit,  III  (1843), 
PP-  35  sq. 

52  Medulla,  I.  vii.  38:  “Hence  the  will  of  God  is  the  first  cause  of 
things.  ‘By  thy  will  they  are  and  were  created’  (Apoc.  iv.  11).  But  the 
will  of  God,  as  He  wills  to  operate  ad  extra,  does  not  presuppose  the 
goodness  of  the  object,  but  by  willing  posits  and  makes  it  good.” 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god  407 

from  Augustin© — for  the  words  are  Augustine’s53 — that 
“the  will  of  God  is  the  necessity  of  things”,  so  little  is  either 
he  or  Augustine  making  use  of  the  words  in  a Pantheistic 
sense  that  he  hastens  to  explain  that  what  he  means  is  only 
that  whatever  God  has  willed  will  certainly  come  to  pass, 
although  it  comes  to  pass  in  “such  a manner  that  the  cause 
and  matter  of  it  are  found  in”  the  second  causes  ( ut  causa 
et  materia  in  ip  sis  reperiatur ).54 

Calvin  beyond  all  question  did  cherish  a very  robust 
faith  in  the  immanence  of  God.  “Our  very  existence”, 
he  says,  “is  subsistence  in  God  alone”  (I.  i.  1).  He  even 
allows,  as  Dr.  Fairbairn  does  not  fail  to  inform  us,  that 
it  may  be  said  with  a pious  meaning — so  only  it  be  the 
expression  of  a pious  mind — that  “nature  is  God”  (I.  v.  5 
end).55  But  Dr.  Fairbairn  neglects  to  mention  that  Calvin 

63  The  phrase  is  quoted  by  Dr.  Fairbairn  (p.  164)  as  Calvin’s,  to  sup- 
port the  assertion  that  he  was  “as  pure  a pantheist  as  Spinoza”.  But 
it  is  cited  by  Calvin  (III.  xxiii.  8)  from  Augustine.  The  matter  in 
immediate  discussion  is  the  perdition  of  the  reprobate. 

64  III.  xxiii.  8. 

85  Cf.  Muller,  De  Godsleer  van  Zwingli  en  Calvijn,  p.  26 : “Accordingly 
also  Pliny  was  right — according  to  Zwingli  ( De  Provid.  Dei  Anamnema, 
iv.  90) — in  calling  what  he  calls  God,  nature,  since  the  learned  cannot 
adjust  themselves  to  the  conceptions  of  God  of  the  ununderstanding 
multitude;  while  by  nature  he  meant  the  power  which  moves  all  things 
together,  and  that  is  nothing  else  but  God.”  Again,  on  the  general 
question  of  the  charge  of  Pantheism  brought  against  Zwingli,  pp.  27-8: 
“As  is  well  known,  it  has  been  supposed  that  there  is  a pantheistic 
element  in  Zwingli’s  Anamnema.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  there  are 
some  expressions  which  sound  Spinozistic ; and  for  those  who  see 
Pantheism  in  every  controversion  of  fortuitism,  Zwingli  must  of  neces- 
sity be  a Pantheist.  Yet  if  we  are  to  discover  Spinozism  in  Zwingli, 
we  can  with  little  difficulty  point  to  traces  of  Spinozism  also  in  Paul. 
Such  a passage  as  the  following,  for  example,  would  certainly  have 
been  subscribed  by  Paul : ‘If  anything  comes  to  pass  by  its  own 
power  or  counsel,  then  the  wisdom  and  power  of  our  Deity  would 
be  superfluous  there.  And  if  that  were  true,  then  the  wisdom  of 
the  Deity  would  not  be  supreme,  because  it  would  not  comprehend 
and  take  in  all  things;  and  his  power  would  not  be  omnipotent, 
because  then  there  would  exist  power  independent  of  God’s  power, 
and  in  that  case  there  would  be  another  power  which  would  not  be 
the  power  of  the  Deity’  (Opp.  vi.  85).  In  any  case,  Zwingli  cannot 
be  given  the  blame  of  standing  apart  from  the  other  Reformers 


408 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


adds  at  once,  that  the  expression  is  “crude  and  unsuitable” 
{dura  et  impropria) , since  “nature  is  rather  the  order  pre- 
scribed by  God”;  and,  moreover,  noxious,  because  tending 
to  “involve  God  confusedly  with  the  inferior  course  of  His 
works”.  He  neglects  also  to  mention  that  the  statement 
occurs  at  the  end  of  a long  discussion,  in  which,  after  re- 
buking those  who  throw  an  obscuring  veil  over  God,  “retire 
Him  behind  nature”,  and  so  substitute  nature  for  Him, — 
Calvin  inveighs  against  the  “babble  about  some  sort  of 
hidden  inspiration  which  actuates  the  whole  world”,  as  not 
only  “weak”  but  “altogether  profane”,  and  brands  the  spec- 
ulation of  a universal  mind  animating  and  actuating  the 
world  as  simply  jejune  (I.  v.  4 and  5).  Even  his  beloved 
Seneca  is  reproved  for  “imagining  a divinity  transfused 
through  all  parts  of  the  world”  so  that  God  is  all  that  we 
see  and  all  that  we  do  not  see  as  well  (I.  xiii.  1),  while  the 
Pantheistic  scheme  of  Servetus  is  made  the  object  of  an 
extended  refutation  (II.  xiv.  5-8).  To  ascribe  an  essentially 
Pantheistic  conception  of  God  to  Calvin  in  the  face  of  such 
frequent  and  energetic  repudiations  of  it  on  his  own  part56 
is  obviously  to  miss  his  meaning  altogether.  If  he  “may  be 
said  to  have  anticipated  Spinoza  in  his  notion  of  God  as 
causa  immanens ”,  and  “Spinoza  may  be  said  ...  to  have 
perfected  and  reduced  to  philosophical  consistency  the  Cal- 
vinistic  conception  of  Deity”,57 — this  can  mean  nothing 
more  than  that  Calvin  was  not  a Deist.  And  in  point  of  fact 

on  this  point.  Calvin  certainly  recognizes  (Inst.  I.  v.  5)  that — so  it 
occurs,  simply — ‘it  may  be  said  out  of  a pious  mind  that  nature  is 
God’  (cf.  Zwingli,  VI.  a.  619:  ‘Call  God  Himself  Nature,  with  the 
philosophers,  the  principle  from  which  all  things  take  their  origin,  from 
which  the  soul  begins  to  be’)  ; although  he  adds  the  warning  that  in 
matters  of  such  importance  ‘no  expressions  should  be  employed  likely 
to  cause  offence’.  Danaeus  (Lib.  I.  77  of  his  Ethices  Christ,  lib.  tres ), 
marvels  that  those  who  would  fain  bear  the  name  of  Christians,  should 
conceive  of  God  and  nature  as  two  different  hypostases,  since  even  the 
heathen  philosophers  (and  like  Zwingli,  he  names  Seneca)  more  truly 
taught  that  ‘the  nature  by  which  we  have  been  brought  forth  is  nothing 
else  than  God’.”  . . . 

B#  Cf.  instances  in  addition  at  I.  xiv.  1,  I.  xv.  5. 

67  Fairbairn,  op.  cit.,  pp.  165-6. 


CALVIN  S DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


409 


he  repudiated  Deism  with  a vehemence  equal  to  that  which 
he  displays  against  Pantheism.  To  rob  God  of  the  active 
exercise  of  His  judgment  and  providence,  shutting  Him  up 
as  an  idler  ( otiosum ) in  heaven,  he  characterizes  as  nothing 
less  than  “detestable  frenzy”,  since,  says  he,  “nothing  could 
less  comport  with  God  than  to  commit  to  fortune  the  aban- 
doned government  of  the  world,  shut  His  eyes  to  the  iniqui- 
ties of  men  and  let  them  wanton  with  impunity”  (I.  iv.  2). 58 

Calvin’s  conception  of  God  is  that  of  a pure  and  clear 
Theism,  in  which  stress  is  laid  at  once  on  His  transcendence 
and  His  immanence,  and  emphasis  is  thrown  on  His  right- 
eous government  of  the  world.  “Let  us  bear  in  mind,  then”, 
he  says  as  he  passes  from  his  repudiation  of  Pantheism, 
“that  there  is  one  God,  who  governs  all  natures”  (I.  v.  6, 
init.),  “and  wishes  us  to  look  to  Him, — to  put  our  trust  in 
Him,  to  worship  and  call  upon  Him”  (I.  v.  6) ; to  whom  we 
can  look  up  as  to  a Father  from  whom  we  expect  and  receive 
tokens  of  love  (I.  v.  3).  So  little  is  he  inclined  to  reduce 
this  divine  Father  to  bare  will,  that  he  takes  repeated  occa- 
sion expressly  to  denounce  this  Scotist  conception.  The 
will  of  God,  he  says,  is  to  us  indeed  the  unique  rule  of  right- 
eousness and  the  supremely  just  cause  of  all  things;  but 
we  are  not  like  the  sophists  to  prate  about  some  sort  of 
“absolute  will”  of  God,  “profanely  separating  His  right- 
eousness from  His  power”,  but  rather  to  adore  the  govern- 
ing providence  which  presides  over  all  things  and  from 
which  nothing  can  proceed  which  is  not  right,  though  the 
reasons  for  it  may  be  hidden  from  us  (I.  xvii,  2,  end). 
“Nevertheless”,  he  remarks  in  another  place,  after  having 
exhorted  his  readers  to  find  in  the  will  of  God  a sufficient 
account  of  things, — “nevertheless,  we  do  not  betake  our- 

08  Cf.  I.  xvi.  1 : “To  make  God  a momentaneous  creator,  who  entirely 
finished  all  His  work  at  once,  were  frigid  and  jejune”,  etc.  Also  the 
Genevan  Catechism  of  1545  (Opp.  vi.  15-18)  : The  particularization  of 
God’s  creatorship  in  the  creed  is  not  to  be  taken  as  indicating  that  God 
so  created  His  works  at  once  that  afterwards  He  rejects  the  care  of 
them.  It  is  rather  so  to  be  held  that  the  world  as  it  was  made  by  Him 
at  once,  so  now  is  conserved  by  Him;  and  He  is  to  remain  their 
supreme  governor,  etc. 


4io 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


selves  to  the  fiction  of  absolute  power,  which,  as  it  is  pro- 
fane, so  ought  to  be  deservedly  detestable  to  us : we  do  not 
imagine  that  the  God  who  is  a law  to  Himself  is  exlex,  . . . 
the  will  of  God  is  not  only  pure  from  all  fault,  but  is  the 
supreme  rule  of  perfection,  even  the  law  of  all  laws”  (III. 
xxiii,  2,  end).59  In  a word,  the  will  of  God  is  to  Calvin 
the  supreme  rule  for  us,  because  it  is  the  perfect  expression 
of  the  divine  perfections.60 

Calvin  thus  refuses  to  be  classified  as  either  Deist,  Pan- 
theist or  Scotist;  and  those  who  would  fain  make  him  one 
or  the  other  of  these  have  nothing  to  go  upon  except  that 
on  the  one  hand  he  does  proclaim  the  transcendence  of 
God  and  speaks  with  contempt  of  men  who  imagine  that 
divinity  is  transfused  into  every  part  of  the  world,  and 
that  there  is  a portion  of  God  not  only  in  us  but  even  in 
wood  and  stone  (I.  xiii.  I,  22)  ; and  on  the  other  he  does 
proclaim  the  immanence  of  God  and  invites  us  to  look 
upon  His  works  or  to  descend  within  ourselves  to  find  Him 
who  “everywhere  diffuses,  sustains,  animates  and  quickens  all 
things  in  heaven  and  in  earth”,  who,  “circumscribed  by  no 

89  It  is  not  uncommon  for  historians  of  doctrine  who  are  inclined  to 
represent  Calvin  as  enunciating  the  Scotist  principle,  therefore,  to 
suggest  that  he  is  scarcely  consistent  with  himself.  Thus,  e.  g.,  H.  C. 
Sheldon,  History  of  Christian  Doctrine  ( 1886) , II.  93 : “Some,  who 
were  inclined  to  extreme  views  of  the  divine  sovereignty,  asserted  the 
Scotist  maxim  that  the  will  of  God  is  the  absolute  rule  of  right. 
Luther’s  words  are  quite  as  explicit  as  those  of  Scotus.  . . . ‘The 

will  of  God’,  says  Calvin  . . . (VI.  iii.  23).  . . . Calvin,  however, 
notwithstanding  this  strong  statement,  suggests  after  all  that  he  meant 
not  so  much  that  God’s  will  is  absolutely  the  highest  rule  of  right,  as 
that  it  is  one  which  we  cannot  transcend,  and  must  regard  as  binding 
on  our  own  judgment;  for  he  adds,  ‘We  represent  not  God  as  lawless, 
who  is  a law  to  Himself’.” 

80  Cf.  Bavinck,  Geref.  Dogmatiek.  II.  226,  who  after  remarking  on 
Calvin’s  rejection  of  the  Scotist  notion  of  potentia  ahsoluta,  as  a “pro- 
fane invention” — adducing  Instt.  III.  xxiii.  1-5;  I.  xvi.  3,  II.  vii.  5, 
IV.  xvii.  24,  Comm,  in  Jes.  239,  in  Luk.  118,  adds:  “The  Romanists  on 
this  account  charge  Calvin  with  limiting  and  therefore  denying  God’s 
omnipotence  (Bellarmine,  De  Gratia  et  Lib.  Arbitrio , III.  c.  15).  But 
Calvin  is  not  denying  that  God  can  do  more  than  He  actually  does,  but 
only  opposing  such  a potentia  absoluta  as  is  not  connected  with  His 
Being  or  Virtues,  and  can  therefore  do  all  kinds  of  inconsistent  things.” 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god  41  i 

boundaries,  by  transfusing  His  own  vigor  into  all  things, 
breathes  into  them  being,  life  and  motion”  (I.  xiii.  14)  ; 
while  still  again  he  does  proclaim  the  will  of  God  to  be 
inscrutable  by  such  creatures  as  we  are  and  to  constitute  to 
us  the  law  of  righteousness,  to  be  accepted  as  such  without 
murmurings  or  questionings.  In  point  of  fact,  all  these 
charges  are  but  several  modes  of  expressing  the  dislike  their 
authors  feel  for  Calvin’s  doctrine  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
divine  will,  which,  following  Augustine,  he  declares  to  be 
'“the  necessity  of  things” : they  would  fain  brand  this  hated 
conception  with  some  name  of  opprobrium,  and,  therefore, 
seek  to  represent  Calvin  now  as  hiding  God  deistically  be- 
hind His  own  law,  and  now  as  reducing  Him  to  a mere 
stream  of  causality,  or  at  least  to  mere  naked  will.61  By 
thus  declining  alternately  to  contradictories  they  show  suffi- 
ciently clearly  that  in  reality  Calvin’s  doctrine  of  God  coin- 
cides with  none  of  these  characterizations. 

The  peculiarity  of  Calvin’s  conception  of  God,  we  per- 
ceive, is  not  indefiniteness,  but  reverential  sobriety.  Clear- 
ing his  skirts  of  all  Pantheistic,  Deistic,  Scotist  notions, — 
and  turning  aside  even  to  repudiate  Manichaeism  and  An- 
thropomorphism (I.  xiii.  1) — he  teaches  a pure  theism 

51 A flagrant  example  may  be  found  in  the  long  argument  of  F.  C. 
Baur,  Die  christl.  Lehre  von  der  Dreieinigkeit,  III.  (1843),  pp.  35  ff., 
where  he  represents  the  Calvinistic  doctrine  of  election  and  reprobation 
as  postulating  in  God  a schism  between  mercy  and  justice  which  can  be 
reduced  only  by  thinking  of  Him  as  wholly  indifferent  to  good  and 
evil,  and  indeed  of  good  and  evil  as  a non-existent  opposition.  If  jus- 
tice is  an  equally  absolute  attribute  with  God  as  grace,  he  argues,  then 
evil  and  good  are  at  one,  in  that  reality  cannot  be  given  to  the  attri- 
bute in  which  the  absolute  being  of  God  consists  without  evil.  Evil  has 
the  same  relation  to  the  absolute  being  of  God  as  good;  and  “God  is 
in  the  same  sense  the  principle  of  evil  as  of  good”;  and  “as  God’s 
justice  cannot  be  without  its  object,  God  must  provide  this  object”. 
“But  if  evil  as  well  as  the  good  is  from  God,  then  on  that  very  account 
evil  is  good:  thus  good  and  evil  are  entirely  indifferent  with  respect  to 
each  other,  and  the  absolute  Dualism  is  resolved  into  the  same  absolute 
arbitrariness  ( Willkiir ) in  which  Duns  Scotus  had  placed  the  absolute 
Being  of  God.”  This,  however,  is  not  represented  as  Calvin’s  view, 
but  as  the  consequence  of  Calvin’s  view — as  drawn  out  in  the  Hege- 
. lianizing  dialectic  of  Baur. 


412 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


which  he  looks  upon  as  native  to  men  (I.  x.  3).  The  nature 
of  this  one  God,  he  conceives,  can  be  known  to  us  only  as 
He  manifests  it  in  His  works  (I.  v.  9)  ; that  is  to  say,  only 
in  His  perfections.  What  we  call  the  attributes  of  God 
thus  become  to  Calvin  the  sum  of  our  knowledge  of  Him. 
In  these  manifestations  of  His  character  we  see  not  indeed 
what  He  is  in  Himself,  but  what  He  is  to  us  (I.  x.  2) ; but 
what  we  see  Him  to  be  thus  to  us,  He  truly  is,  and  this  is 
all  we  can  know  about  Him.  We  might  expect  to  find  in  the 
Institutes , therefore,  a comprehensive  formal  discussion  of 
the  attributes,  by  means  of  which  what  God  is  to  us  should 
be  fully  set  before  us.  This,  however,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  we  do  not  get.62  And  much  less  do  we  get  any  meta- 
physical discussion  of  the  nature  of  the  attributes  of  God, 
their  relation  to  one  another,  or  to  the  divine  essence  of 
which  they  are  determinations.  We  must  not  therefore 
suppose,  however,  that  we  get  little  or  nothing  of  them,  or 
little  or  nothing  to  the  point.  On  the  contrary,  besides  inci- 
dental allusions  to  them  throughout  the  discussion,  from 
which  we  may  glean  much  of  Calvin’s  conceptions  of  them, 
they  are  made  the  main  subject  of  two  whole  chapters,  the 
one  of  which  discusses  in  considerable  detail  the  revelation 
of  the  divine  perfections  in  His  works  and  deeds,  the  other 
the  revelation  made  of  them  in  His  Word.  We  have  already 
remarked  upon  the  skill  with  which  Calvin,  at  the  opening 
of  his  discussion  of  the  doctrine  of  God  (ch.  x),  manages, 
under  color  of  pointing  out  the  harmony  of  the  description 
of  God  given  in  the  Scriptures  with  the  conception  of  Him 
we  may  draw  from  His  works,  to  bring  all  he  had  to  say  of 
the  divine  attributes  at  once  before  the  reader’s  eye.  The 
Scriptures,  says  he,  are  in  essence  here  merely  a plainer 
(I.  xi.  1)  republication  of  the  general  revelation  given  of 
God  in  His  works  and  deeds : they  “contain  nothing”  in 

<a  Cf.  P.  J.  Muller,  De  Godsleer  van  Zwingli  en  Calvijn,  p.  40: 
“Neither  in  Zwingli  nor  in  Calvin  do  we  meet  with  a formal  ‘doctrine- 
of  the  attributes'  or  with  a classification  of  the  attributes.  No  doubt 
it  happens  that  both  occasionally  name  a number  of  attributes  together;, 
and  have  something  to  say  of  each  attribute  in  particular.” 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


4i3 


their  descriptions  of  God,  “but  what  may  be  known  from 
the  contemplation  of  the  creatures”  (I.  x.  2,  med.).  And  he 
illustrates  this  remark  by  quoting  from  Moses  (Ex.  xxxiv. 
6),  the  Psalms  (cxlv)  and  the  prophets  (Jer.  ix.  24)  pas- 
sages in  which  God  is  richly  described,  and  remarking  on 
the  harmony  of  the  perfections  enumerated  with  those  which 
he  had  in  the  earlier  chapter  (v)  pointed  out  as  illustrated  in 
the  divine  works  and  deeds.  This  comparison  involves  a 
tolerably  full  enumeration  and  some  discussion  of  the  sev- 
eral attributes,  here  on  the  basis  of  Scripture,  as  formerly 
(ch.  v)  on  the  basis  of  nature.  He  does  not,  therefore, 
neglect  the  attributes  so  much  as  deal  with  them  in  a some- 
what indirect  manner.  And,  we  may  add,  in  a highly  prac- 
tical way : for  here  too  his  zeal  is  to  avoid  “airy  and  vain 
speculations”  of  what  God  is  in  Himself  and  to  focus  atten- 
tion upon  what  He  is  to  us,  that  our  knowledge  of  Him  may 
be  of  the  nature  of  a lively  perception  and  religious  reaction 
(I.  x.  2 mit.  et  fin.). 

In  a number  of  passages  Calvin  brings  together  a plurality 
of  the  attributes — his  name  for  them  is  “virtues”63 — and 
even  hints  at  a certain  classification  of  them.  One  of  the 
most  beautiful  of  these  passages  formed  the  opening  words 
of  the  first  draft  of  the  Institutes , but  fell  out  in  the  subse- 
quent revisions — to  the  regret  of  some,  who  consider  it,  on 
the  whole,  the  most  comprehensive  description  of  God  Cal- 
vin has  given  us.64  It  runs  as  follows : “The  sum  of  holy 

63 Virtutes  Dei , I.  ii.  1;  v.  9,  9,  10;  x.  2.  In  xiii.  4 med.  he  uses  the 
term  attributa.  In  xiii.  1,  speaking  of  the  divine  spirituality  and  im- 
mensity, he  used  epitheta. 

“Kostlin,  as  cited,  p.  62:  “On  the  other  hand, — and  this  is  the  most 
important  for  us, — there  is  not  given  in  the  Institutes  any  comprehen- 
sive presentation  of  the  attributes,  especially  of  the  ethical  attributes 
of  God,  nor  is  any  such  attempted  anywhere  afterwards ; the  first 
edition,  which  began  with  some  comprehensive  propositions  about  God 
as  infinite  wisdom,  righteousness,  mercy,  etc.,  rather  raises  an  expecta- 
tion of  something  more  in  the  later,  more  thoroughly  worked  out 
editions  of  the  work : but  these  propositions  fell  out  of  the  first  edition 
and  were  never  afterward  developed.”  In  the  intermediate  editions 
(1543-1550)  this  paragraph  has  taken  the  form  of:  “Nearly  the  whole 
sum  of  our  wisdom — and  this  certainly  should  be  esteemed  true  and 
solid  wisdom — consists  in  two  facts : the  knowledge  of  God  and  of 


414 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


doctrine  consists  of  just  these  two  points,' — the  knowledge 
of  God  and  the  knowledge  of  ourselves.  These,  now,  are 
the  things  which  we  must  keep  in  mind  concerning  God. 
First,  we  should  hold  fixed  in  firm  faith  that  He  is  infinite 
wisdom,  righteousness,  goodness,  mercy,  truth,  power 
( virtus ) and  life,  so  that  there  exists  no  other  wisdom, 
righteousness,  goodness,  mercy,  truth,  power  and  life 
(Baruch  iii.  31,  35;  James  i.  16),  and  wheresoever  any  of 
these  things  is  seen,  it  is  from  Him  (Rev.  xvi.  1-4,  9).  Sec- 
ondly, that  all  that  is  in  heaven  or  on  earth  has  been  created 
for  His  glory  (Ps.  cxlviii.  1-14;  Dan.  iii.  28,  29)  ; and  it  is 
justly  due  to  Him  that  everything,  according  to  its  own 
nature,  should  serve  Him,  acknowledge  His  authority,  seek 
His  glory  and  obediently  accept  Him  as  Lord  and  King 
(Rev.  i.  25).  Thirdly,  that  He  is  Himself  a just  judge,  and 
will  therefore  be  severely  avenged  on  those  who  depart  from 
His  commandments,  and  are  not  in  all  things  subject  to  His 
will;  who  in  thought,  word  and  deed  have  not  sought  His 
glory  (Ps.  lxxix.  10,  18;  Rev.  ii.  6,  11).  In  the  fourth 
place  that  He  is  merciful  and  long-suffering,  and  will  receive 
into  His  kingdom,  the  miserable  and  despised  who  take 
refuge  in  His  clemency  and  trust  in  His  faithfulness ; and  is 
ready  to  spare  and  forgive  those  who  ask  His  favor,  to 
succor  and  help  those  who  seek  His  aid,  and  desirous  of 
saving  those  who  put  their  trust  in  Him  (Is.  lv.  3, 6 ; Ps.  xxv. 
6-1 1,  lxxxv.  3-5,  10). ” In  the  first  clause  of  this  striking 
paragraph  we  have  a formal  enumeration  of  God’s  ethical 
attributes,  which  is  apparently  meant  to  be  generically  com- 

ourselves.  The  one,  now,  not  only  shows  that  there  is  one  God 
whom  all  ought  to  worship  and  adore,  but  at  the  same  time  teaches 
also  that  this  one  God  is  the  source  of  all  truth,  wisdom,  goodness, 
righteousness,  justice,  mercy,  power,  holiness,  so  that  we  are  taught 
that  we  ought  to  expect  and  seek  all  these  things  from  Him,  and  when 
we  receive  them  to  refer  them  to  Him  with  praise  and  gratitude.  The 
other,  however,  by  manifesting  to  us  our  weakness,  misery,  vanity  and 
foulness,  first  brings  us  into  serious  humility,  dejection,  diffidence  and 
hatred  of  ourselves,  and  then  kindles  a longing  in  us  to  seek  God,  in 
whom  is  to  be  found  every  good  thing  of  which  we  discover  ourselves 
to  be  so  empty  and  lacking.” 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


4i5 


plete, — although  in  the  course  of  the  paragraph  other  specific 
forms  of  attributes  here  enumerated  occur;  and  all  of  them 
are  declared  to  exist  in  God  in  an  infinite  mode.  The  list  con- 
tains seven  items:  wisdom;  righteousness;  goodness  (clem- 
ency) ; mercy  (long-sufferingness)  ; truth;  power;  life.65  If 
we  compare  this  list  with  the  enumeration  in  the  famous 
definition  of  God  in  the  Westminster  Shorter  Catechism 
(Q.  4), 66  we  shall  see  that  it  is  practically  the  same:  the 
only  difference  being  that  Calvin  adds  to  the  general  term 
‘goodness’  the  more  specific  ‘mercy’,  affixes  ‘life’  at  the  end, 
and  omits  ‘holiness’,  doubtless  considering  it  to  be  covered 
by  the  general  term  ‘righteousness’. 

If  just  this  enumeration  does  not  recur  in  the  Institutes 
as  finally  revised,  something  very  like  it  evidently  underlies 
more  passages  than  one.  Even  in  the  first  section  of  the  first 
chapter,  which  has  taken  its  place,  we  have  an  enumeration 
of  the  ‘good  things’  (bona)  in  God  which  stand  opposed  to 
our  ‘evil  things’  (mala),  that  brings  together  wisdom,  power, 
goodness  and  righteousness : for  in  God  alone,  we  are  told, 
can  be  found  “the  true  light  of  wisdom , solid  power  ( virtus ), 
a perfect  affluence  of  all  good  things,  and  the  purity  of  right- 
eousness” (I.  i.  1).  In  the  opening  section  of  the  next  chap- 
ter we  have  two  enumerations  of  the  divine  perfections, 
obviously  rhetorical,  and  yet  betraying  an  underlying  basis 
of  systematic  arrangement:  the  later  and  fuller  of  these 
brings  together  power,  wisdom,  goodness,  righteousness, 
justice,  mercy, — closing  with  a reference  to  God’s  powerful 
‘protection’.  God,  we  are  told,  “sustains  this  world  by  His 
immense  power  ( immensa  potentia),  governs  it  by  His  wis- 
dom, preserves  it  by  His  goodness , rules  over  the  human  race 
especially  by  His  righteousness  and  justice  (judicium), 
bears  with  it  in  His  mercy , defends  it  by  His  protection 

63  In  the  list  which  takes  the  place  of  this  in  the  middle  editions  of 
the  Institutes,  the  order  is  different  (and  scarcely  so  regular),  and 
‘life’  is  omitted,  while  ‘justice’  is  added  to  ‘righteousness’,  and  ‘sanctity’ 
appended  at  the  end,  and  ‘potentia’  substituted  for  ‘virtus’ : “truth ; 
wisdom;  goodness;  righteousness;  justice;  mercy;  (power);  holiness.,y 

68  “Wisdom,  power,  holiness,  justice,  goodness,  and  truth.” 


416 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


(praesidium) The  most  complete  enumerations  of  all, 
however,  are  given,  when,  leaving  the  intimations  of  nature, 
Calvin  analyses  some  Scriptural  passages  with  a view  to 
drawing  out  their  descriptions  of  the  divine  perfections.  His 
analysis  of  Exod.  xxxiv.  6 is  particularly  full  (I.  x.  2).  He 
finds  the  divine  eternity  and  self-existence  embodied  in  the 
name  Jehovah;  the  divine  strength  and  power  ( virtus  et 
potentia ) expressed  in  the  name  Elohim;  and  in  the  descrip- 
tion itself  an  enumeration  of  those  virtues  which  describe 
God  not  indeed  as  He  is  apud  se,  but  as  He  is  erga  nos — to 
wit,  His  clemency,  goodness,  mercy,  righteousness,  justice, 
truth.  The  strongest  claim  which  this  passage  has  on  our 
interest,  however,  is  the  suggestion  it  bears  of  a classification 
of  the  attributes.  The  predication  to  God  of  eternity  and 
self-existence  ( avrovaia  ) evidently  is  for  Calvin  something 
specifically  different  from  the  ascription  to  Him  of  those 
virtues  by  which  are  described  not  what  He  is  apud  se,  but 
what  He  shows  Himself  to  be  erga  nos.  They  in  a word 
belong  rather  to  the  quiddity  of  God  than  to  His  qualitas. 
In  a subsequent  passage  (xiii.  1)  we  have  a plainer  hint  to 
the  same  effect.  There  we  are  given  “two  epithets”  which 
we  are  told  are  applied  by  Scripture  to  the  very  “essence” 
of  God,  in  its  rare  speech  concerning  His  essence — immen- 
sity and  spirituality.67  It  seems  quite  clear,  then,  that  Calvin 
was  accustomed  to  distinguish  in  his  thought  between  such 
epithets,  describing  what  God  is  apud  se,  and  those  virtues 
by  which  He  is  manifested  to  us  in  His  relations  erga  nos. 
That  is  to  say,  he  distinguishes  between  what  are  sometimes 
called  His  physical  or  metaphysical  and  His  ethical  attrib- 
utes : that  is  to  say,  between  the  fundamental  modes  of  the 
Divine  Being  and  the  constitutive  qualities  of  the  Divine 
Person.68 

If  we  profit  by  this  hint  and  then  collect  the  attributes 

67  Quod  de  immensa  et  spirituali  Dei  essentia  traditur  in  Scripturis 
. . . parce  de  sua  essentia  disserit,  duobus  tamen  illis  quae  dixi 
epithetis.  . . . 

88  See  the  distinction  very  luminously  drawn  out  by  J.  H.  Thornwell, 

Works , I.  168-9. 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


4i7 


of  the  two  classes  as  Calvin  occasionally  mentions  them,  we 
shall  in  effect  reconstruct  Calvin’s  definition  of  God.69  This 
would  run  somewhat  as  follows : There  is  but  one  only  true 
God,70  a self-existent,71  simple,72  invisible,73  incomprehen- 
sible74 Spirit,75  infinite,76  immense,77  eternal,78  perfect,79 
in  His  Being,  power,80  knowledge,81  wisdom,82  righteous- 
ness,83 justice,84  holiness,85  goodness86  and  truth.87  In  ad- 

69  Perhaps  as  near  as  Calvin  ever  came  to  framing  an  exact  definition 
of  God  apud  se,  is  the  description  of  God  in  the  middle  edd.  of  the 
Institutes,  VI.  7 (Opp.  xxix,  480),  summed  up  in  the  opening  words: 
“That  there  is  one  God  of  eternal,  infinite  and  spiritual  essence,  the 
Scriptures  currently  declare  with  plainness.”  The  essence  of  God  then 
is  eternal,  infinite  and  spiritual.  Cf.  Adv.  P.  Caroli  Calumnias  (Opp. 
vii.  312)  : “The  one  God  which  the  Scriptures  preach  to  us  we  believe 
in  and  adore,  and  we  think  of  Him  as  He  is  described  to  us  by  them, 
to  wit,  as  of  eternal,  infinite  and  spiritual  essence,  who  also  alone  has 
in  Himself  the  power  of  existence  from  Himself  and  bestows  it  upon 
His  creatures.” 

70  unicus  et  verus  Deus,  I.  ii.  2 ; unicus  Deus,  xii.  1 ; xiii.  2 ; unus 
Deus,  ii,  1 ; v.  6;  x.  3 ; xii.  1;  verus  Deus,  x.  3;  unitas  Dei,  xiii.  1,  etc. 

71  a se  principium  habens,  v.  6 ; avrovala f x.  2 ; airovvLa,  id  est  a se 
ipso  existentia,  xiv.  3. 

73  simplex  Dei  essentia,  xiii.  2 ; simplex  et  individua  essentia  Dei, 
xiii.  2;  una  simplexque  Deitas,  Adv.  Val.  Gent. 

78  invisibilis  Deus,  II.  vi.  4 (made  visible  in  Christ,  so  also  II.  ix.  4)  ; 
invisibilis  I.  xi.  3 (of  Holy  Spirit). 

74  incomprehensibilis  v.  1 ; xi.  3 (in  xiii.  1 apparently  used  for  im- 
mensa).. 

70  spiritualis  Dei  essentia,  xiii.  1 ; spiritualis  natura,  xiii.  1. 

78  in  Deo  residet  bonorum  infinitas,  i.  I (cf.  ed.  1.  I.  ad  init  [p.  42], 
infinitam). 

77  immensa  essentia  Dei,  xiii.  1;  ejus  immensitas,  xiii,  1;  immensitas, 
xiii.  1 ; immensa  Dei  essentia,  xiii.  2. 

78 aeternitas,  v.  6;  x.  2;  xiii.  17;  xiv.  3;  aeternus  [Deus],  v.  6. 

78  exacta  justiciae,  sapientiae  virtutis  ejus  perfectio,  i.  2. 

80potentia,  ii.  1 ; v.  3,  6,  8;  x.  2 ; immensa  potentia,  ii,  1 ; v.  1,  3,  6,  8; 

omnipotentia,  xvi.  3;  omnipotens,  xvi.  3:  virtus,  i.  1,  3;  v.  6;  x.  2; 
virtus  et  potentia,  x.  2. 

81  notitia,  III.  xxi  5 ; praescientia,  III.  xxi.  5. 

“sapientia,  i.  1,  3;  ii.  1 ; v.  1,  2,  3,  8,  10;  mirifica  sapientia,  v.  2. 

83justitia,  ii.  1;  x.  2;  III.  xxiii.  4;  justitiae  puritas,  i.  1;  justitia  judi- 
■ciumque,  ii.  1. 

84  judicium  ii.  1;  x.  2;  justitia  judiciumque,  ii.  1;  justus  judex,  ii.  1. 

88  sanctitas,  x.  2 ; puritas,  i.  3 ; divina  puritas,  i.  2. 

Mbonitas,  ii.  1 ; v.  3,  6,  9 ; x.  1,  2;  xv.  1 : bonus,  iii.  2. 

87  veritas,  x.  2;  Deus  verax,  III.  xx.  26. 


27 


418 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


dition  to  these  more  general  designations,  Calvin  employs 
a considerable  number  of  more  specific  terms,  by  which  he 
more  precisely  expresses  his  thought  and  more  fully  expli- 
cates the  contents  of  the  several  attributes.  Thus,  for  ex- 
ample, he  is  fond  of  the  term  “severity”88  when  he  is  en- 
deavoring to  give  expression  to  God’s  attitude  as  a just 
judge  to  the  wicked;  and  he  is  fond  of  setting  in  contrast 
with  it  the  corresponding  term  “clemency”89  to  express  His 
attitude  towards  the  repentant  sinner.  It  is  especially  the 
idea  of  “goodness”  which  he  thus  draws  out  into  its  several 
particular  manifestations.  Beside  the  term  “clemency”  he 
sets  the  still  greater  word  “mercy”,  or  “pity”,90  and  by  the 
side  of  this  again  he  sets  the  even  greater  word  “grace”,91 
while  the  more  general  idea  of  “goodness”  he  develops  by  the 
aid  of  such  synonyms  as  “beneficence”92  and  “benignity”,93 
and  almost  exhausts  the  capacity  of  the  language  to  give  ex- 
pression to  his  sense  of  the  richness  of  the  Divine  goodness.94 
God  is  “good  and  merciful”  (iii.  2),  “benign  and  benefi- 
cent” (v.  7),  “the  fount  and  source  of  all  good”  (ii.  2), 
their  fecund  “author”  (ii.  2),  whose  “will  is  prone  to  benefi- 
cence” (x.  1),  and  in  whom  dwells  a “perfect  affluence”, 
nothing  less  than  an  “infinity”,  of  good  things.  And  there- 
fore he  looks  upwards  to  this  God  not  only  as  our  Lord 
(ii.  1)  the  Creator  (ii.  1),  Sustainer  (ii.  1)  and  Governor 
(ii.  1)  of  the  world — and  more  particularly  its  “moral  gov- 
ernor” (ii.  2),  its  “just  judge”  (ii.  2), — but  more  especially 
as  our  “defender  and  protector”,95  our  Father96  who  is  also 

88severitas,  ii.  2;  v.  7,  10;  xvii.  1. 

89  dementia,  v.  7,  8,  10 ; x.  2. 

90  misericordia,  ii.  1;  x.  2;  misericors,  iii.  2 (bonus  et  misericors). 

91  gratia,  v.  3. 

92  beneficus,  v.  7 ; voluntas  ad  beneficentiam  prodivis,  x.  1 ; Dei  favor 
et  beneficentia,  xvii.  1. 

93  benignitas,  v.  7;  benignus  et  beneficus,  v.  7. 

91  bonus  et  misericors,  iii.  2 ; benignus  et  beneficus,  v.  7 ; bonorum 
omnium  fons  et  origc,  ii.  2;  bonorum  omnium  autor,  ii.  2;  voluntas  ad 
beneficentiam  prodivis,  x.  1 ; bonorum  omnium  perfecta  affluentia,  i.  1 ; 
in  Deo  residet  bonorum  infinitas,  i.  1. 

"tutor  et  protector,  ii.  2. 

98  Dominus  et  Pater,  ii.  2. 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


419 


our  Lord,  in  whose  “fatherly  indulgence”97  we  may  trust. 

There  is  in  the  Institutes  little  specific  exposition  of  the 
the  manner  in  which  we  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  these 
attributes.  The  works  of  God,  we  are  told,  illustrate  par- 
ticularly His  wisdom  (v.  2)  and  His  power  (v.  6).  But 
His  power,  we  are  further  told,  leads  us  on  to  think  of  His 
eternity  and  His  self-existence,  “because  it  is  necessary 
that  He  from  whom  everything  derives  its  origin,  should 
Himself  be  eternal  and  have  the  ground  of  His  being  in 
Himself”  :98  while  we  must  posit  His  goodness  to  account 
for  His  will  to  create  and  preserve  the  world.99  By  the 
works  of  providence  God  manifests  primarily  His  benignity 
and  beneficence;  and  in  His  dealing  with  the  pious.  His 
clemency,  with  the  wicked  His  severity100 — which  are  but 
the  two  sides  of  His  righteousness:  although,  of  course, 
His  power  and  wisdom  are  equally  conspicuous.101  It  is 
precisely  the  same  body  of  attributes  which  are  ascribed  to 
God  in  the  Scriptures,102  and  that  not  merely  in  such  a 
passage  as  Ex.  xxxiv.  6,  to  which  we  have  already  alluded, 
but  everywhere  throughout  their  course  (x.  1,  fin.).  Psalm 
cxl,  for  example,  so  exactly  enumerates  the  whole  list  of 
God’s  perfections  that  scarcely  one  is  lacking.  Jeremiah 
ix.  24,  while  not  so  full,  is  to  the  same  effect.  Certainly 
the  three  perfections  there  mentioned  are  the  most  necessary 
of  all  for  us  to  know, — the  divine  “mercy  in  which  alone 
consists  all  our  salvation;  His  justice,  which  is  exercised  on 
the  wicked  every  day,  and  awaits  them  more  grievously 
still  in  eternal  destruction;  His  righteousness,  by  which  the 
faithful  are  preserved  and  most  lovingly  supported.” 
“Nor”  adds  Calvin,  is  there  any  real  omission  here  of  the 
other  perfections — “either  of  His  truth,  or  power,  or  holi- 

97  Paterna  indulgentia,  v.  7. 

98  v.  6:  iam  ipsa  potentia  nos  ad  cogitandam  ejus  aeternitatem  deducit; 
quia  aeternum  esse,  et  a se  ipso  principium  habere  necesse  est  unde 
omnium  trahunt  originem. 

99  Do. 

100  v.  7. 

101  v.  8. 


x.  2. 


420 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


ness,  or  goodness”.  “For  how  could  we  be  assured,  as  is 
here  required,  of  His  righteousness,  mercy  and  justice,  un- 
less we  were  supported  by  His  inflexible  veracity?  And 
how  could  we  believe  that  He  governs  the  world  in  justice 
and  righteousness  unless  we  acknowledged  His  power  ? 
And  whence  proceeds  His  mercy  but  from  His  goodness? 
And  if  all  His  ways  are  justice,  mercy,  righteousness,  cer- 
tainly holiness  also  is  conspicuous  in  them.”  The  divine 
power,  righteousness,  justice,  holiness,  goodness,  mercy, 
and  truth  are  here  brought  together  and  concatenated  one 
with  the  others,  with  some  indication  of  their  mutual  rela- 
tions, and  with  a clear  intimation  that  God  is  not  properly 
conceived  unless  He  is  conceived  in  all  His  perfections.  Any 
description  of  Him  which  omits  more  or  fewer  of  these 
perfections,  it  is  intimated,  is  justly  chargeable  with  defect. 
Similarly  when  dealing  with  those  more  fundamental  “epi- 
thets” by  which  His  essence  is  described  (xii.  i),  he  makes 
it  plain  that  not  to  embrace  them  all  in  our  thought  of  God, 
and  that  in  their  integrity,  is  to  invade  His  majesty:  the 
fault  of  the  Manichaeans  was  that  they  broke  up  the  unity 
of  God  and  restricted  His  immensity.103 

There  is  no  lack  in  Calvin’s  treatment  of  the  attributes, 
then,  of  a just  sense  of  their  variety  or  of  the  necessity  of 
holding  them  all  together  in  a single  composite  conception 
that  we  may  do  justice  in  our  thought  to  God.  He  obviously 
has  in  mind  the  whole  series  of  the  divine  perfections  in  clear 
and  just  discrimination,  and  he  accurately  conceives  them  as 
falling  apart  into  two  classes,  the  one  qualities  of  the  divine 
essence,  the  other  characteristics  of  the  Divine  person. — in  a 
word,  essential  and  personal  attributes : and  he  fully  realizes 
the  relation  of  these  two  classes  to  one  another,  and  as  well 
the  necessity  of  embracing  each  of  the  attributes  in  its  integ- 
rity in  our  conception  of  God.  if  we  are  to  do  any  justice 
whatever  to  that  conception. 

What  seems  to  be  lacking  in  Calvin’s  treatment  of  the 

103 1,  xiii.  i : Certe  hoc  fuit  et  Dei  unitatem  abrumpere,  et  restringere 
immensitatem. 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


421 


attributes  is  detailed  discussion  of  the  notion  imbedded  in 
each  several  attribute  and  elaboration  of  this  notion  as  a 
necessary  element  in  our  conception  of  God.  Calvin  em- 
ploys the  terms  unity,  simplicity,  self-existence,  incompre- 
hensibility, spirituality,  infinity,  immensity,  eternity,  immu- 
tability, perfection,  power,  wisdom,  righteousness,  justice, 
holiness,  goodness,  benignity,  beneficence,  clemency,  mercy, 
grace,104  as  current  terms  bearing  well-understood  meanings, 
and  does  not  stop  to  develop  their  significance  except  by 
incidental  remarks.1048  The  confidence  which  he  places  in 
their  conveyance  of  their  meaning  seems  to  be  justified  by 
the  event;  although,  no  doubt,  much  of  the  effect  of  their 
mere  enumeration  is  due  to  the  remarkable  lucidity  of  Cal- 
vin’s thought  and  style:  he  uses  his  terms  with  such  con- 
sistency and  exactness,  that  they  become  self-defining  in 
their  context.  We  are  far,  then,  from  saying  that  his 
method  of  dealing  with  the  attributes,  by  mere  allusion  as 
we  might  almost  call  it,  is  inadequate  for  the  practical  relig- 
ious purpose  for  which  he  was  writing:  and  certainly  it  is 
far  more  consonant  with  the  literary  rather  than  scholastic 
form  he  gives  his  treatise.  When  we  suggest,  then,  that 
from  the  scholastic  point  of  view  it  seems  that  it  is  precisely 
at  this  point  that  Calvin’s  treatment  of  the  attributes  falls 

104  These  are  fairly  brought  together  by  P.  J.  Muller,  De  Godsleer 
van  Calvijn,  1881,  pp.  39-44.  The  third  section  of  the  Instruction 
(French,  1537)  or  Catechism  (Latin,  1538)  is  almost  a complete  treatise 
in  brief  on  the  attributes.  As  in  the  Institutes,  on  which  this  Catechis- 
mus  is  based,  the  attributes  derived  from  the  study  of  the  Divine  Works 
are  first  enumerated  and  then  those  derived  from  the  Word.  As  to  the 
former  Calvin  says : “For  we  contemplate  in  this  universe  of  things,  the 
immortality  of  our  God,  from  which  has  proceeded  the  commencement 
and  origin  of  all  things ; His  power  (potentia)  which  has  both  made 
and  now  sustains  so  great  a structure  (moles,  machine)  ; His  wisdom, 
which  has  composed  and  perpetually  governs  so  great  and  confused  a 
variety  in  an  order  so  distinct ; His  goodness,  which  has  been  the  cause 
to  itself  that  all  these  things  were  created  and  now  exist;  His  justice, 
which  wonderfully  manifests  itself  in  the  defense  of  the  good  and  the 
punishment  of  the  wicked;  His  mercy,  which,  that  we  may  be  called  to 
repentance,  endures  our  wickedness  with  so  great  a clemency.” 

104a  Observe  the  admirable  discussion  of  the  omnipotence  of  God  after 
this  incidental  fashion  in  Institutes,  I.  xvi.  3. 


422 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


somewhat  short  of  what  we  might  desire,  we  must  not 
permit  to  slip  out  of  our  memory  that  Calvin  expressly 
repudiates  the  scholastic  point  of  view  and  is  of  set  purpose 
simple  and  practical.105  He  does  not  seek  to  obtain  for 
himself  or  to  recommend  to  others  such  a knowledge  of 
God  as  merely  ‘raises  idle  speculation  in  the  brain’ ; but  such 
as  ‘shall  be  firm  and  fruitful’  and  have  its  seat  in  the  heart. 
He  purposely  rejects,  therefore,  the  philosophical  mode  of 
dealing  with  the  attributes  and  devotes  himself  to  awaken- 
ing in  the  hearts  of  his  readers  a practical  knowledge  of 
God,  a knowledge  which  functions  first  in  the  fear  ( timor ) 
of  God  and  then  in  trust  ( fducia ) in  Him. 

And  here  we  must  pause  to  take  note  of  this  two-fold 
characterization  of  the  religious  emotion,  corresponding,  as 
it  does  in  Calvin’s  conception,  to  the  double  aspect  in  which 
God  is  contemplated  by  those  who  know  Him.  God  is  our 

105  Cf.  P.  J.  Muller,  De  Godsleer  van  Calvijn,  p.  45:  “No  doubt  we 
should  expect  a doctrine  of  the  attributes,  when  we  hear  him  say  that 
God  has  revealed  Himself  in  His  virtutes,  but  we  should  bear  in  mind 
that  Calvin  (although  not  always  free  himself  from  philosophical  in- 
fluences) renounces  philosophical  treatment  of  theological  questions, 
and  is  extremely  practical,  so  that  it  is  to  him,  for  example,  less  im- 
portant to  seek  a connection  between  the  several  attributes,  than  to 
point  out  what  we  may  learn  from  them  not  so  much  of  God,  as  for 
ourselves  and  our  lives.” — So,  also,  De  Godsleer  van  Zwingli  en  Cal- 
vijn, pp.  47-8:  “Calvin  does  not  recommend  such  a ‘knowledge  of  God’ 
as  merely  ‘raises  an  idle  speculation  in  the  brain’,  but  such  an  one  ‘as 
should  be  firm  and  fruitful  also  in  consequences,  which  can  be  expected 
only  of  the  knowledge  which  has  its  seat  in  the  heart’  (I.  v.  9).  He 
considers  the  knowledge  of  the  nature  and  of  the  attributes  of  God 
more  a matter  of  the  heart  than  of  the  understanding;  and  such  knowl- 
edge not  only  must  arouse  us  to  the  service  cf  God,  but  must  also 
plant  in  us  the  hope  of  a future  life  (I.  v.  10).  In  his  extreme  prac- 
ticality— as  the  last  remark  shows  us — Calvin  rejected  the  philosophical 
treatment  of  the  question.  The  Scriptures,  for  him  the  fountain  of  the 
knowledge  of  God,  he  takes  as  his  guide  in  his  remarks  on  the  at- 
tributes.” Compare  what  Lobstein  says  in  his  Etudes  sur  la  Doctrine 
Chretienne  de  Dieu,  1907,  p.  113:  “The  passages  of  Calvin’s  Institutes 
devoted  to  the  idea  of  the  divine  omnipotence  are  inspired  and  domi- 
nated by  the  living  interest  of  piety,  which  gives  to  their  discussions  a 
restrained  emotion  and  a warmth  to  which  no  reader  can  remain 
insensible.” 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


423 


Lord,  in  whose  presence  awe  and  reverence  become  us ; God 
is  our  Father,  to  whom  we  owe  trust  and  love.  Fear  and 
love — both  must  be  present  where  true  piety  is:  for,  says 
Calvin,  what  “I  call  piety  (pietas)  is  that  reverence  com- 
bined with  love  of  God,  which  a knowledge  of  His  benefits 
produces”  (I.  ii.  1).  In  the  form  he  has  given  this  state- 
ment the  element  of  reverence  ( reverentia ) appears  to  be 
made  the  formative  element : piety  is  reverence,  although  it 
is  not  reverence  without  love.  But  if  it  is  not  reverence  in 
and  of  itself  but  only  the  reverence  which  is  informed  by 
love,  love  after  all  may  be  held  to  become  the  determining 
element  of  true  piety.  And  Calvin  does  not  hesitate  to  declare 
with  the  greatest  emphasis  that  the  apprehension  of  God  as 
deserving  of  our  worship  and  adoration — in  a word  as  our 
Lord — simpliciter , does  not  suffice  to  produce  true  piety: 
that  is  not  born,  he  says,  until  “we  are  persuaded  that  God  is 
the  fountain  of  all  that  is  good  and  cease  to  seek  for  good 
elsewhere  than  in  Him”  {ibid.)  ; that  is  to  say,  until  we 
apprehend  Him  as  our  Father  as  well  as  our  Lord.  “For”, 
adds  he,  “until  men  feel  that  they  owe  everything  to  God, 
that  they  are  cherished  by  His  paternal  care,  that  He  is  the 
author  to  them  of  all  good  things  and  nothing  is  to  be 
sought  out  of  Him,  they  will  never  subject  themselves  to 
Him  in  willing  obedience  {observantia,  reverent  obedience)  ; 
or  rather  I should  say,  unless  they  establish  for  themselves 
a solid  happiness  in  Him  they  will  never  devote  themselves 
to  Him  without  reserve  truly  and  heartily  (vere  et  ex  animo 
totos ).”  And  then  he  proceeds  (I.  ii.  2)  to  expound  at 
length  how  the  knowledge  of  God  should  first  inspire  us 
with  fear  and  reverence  and  then  lead  us  to  look  to  Him  for 
good.  The  first  thought  of  Him  awakes  us  to  our  depend- 
ence on  Him  as  our  Lord : any  clear  view  of  Him  begets  in 
us  a sense  of  Him  as  the  fountain  and  origin  of  all  that  is 
good, — such  as  in  anyone  not  depraved  by  sin  must  inev- 
itably arouse  a desire  to  adhere  to  Him  and  put  his  trust 
( fiducia ) in  Him, — because  he  must  recognize  in  Him  a 
guardian  and  protector  worthy  of  complete  confidence 


424 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


( fidem ).  “Because  he  perceives  Him  to  be  the  author  of  all 
good,  in  trial  or  in  need”,  he  proceeds,  still  expounding  the 
state  of  mind  of  the  truly  pious  man,  “he  at  once  commits 
himself  to  His  protection,  expectant  of  His  help;  because  he 
is  convinced  that  He  is  good  and  merciful,  he  rests  on  Him 
in  assured  trust  ( fiducia ),  never  doubting  that  a remedy  is 
prepared  in  His  clemency  for  all  his  ills;  because  he  recog- 
nizes Him  as  Lord  and  Father,  he  is  sure  that  he  ought  to 
regard  His  government  in  all  things,  revere  His  majesty, 
seek  His  glory,  and  obey  His  behests;  because  he  perceives 
Him  to  be  a just  judge,  armed  with  severity  for  punishing 
iniquities,  he  keeps  His  tribunal  always  in  view,  and  in  fear 
restrains  and  checks  himself  from  provoking  His  wrath. 
And  yet,  he  is  not  so  terrified  by  the  sense  of  His  justice, 
that  he  wishes  to  escape  from  it,  even  if  flight  were  possible : 
rather  he  embraces  Him  not  less  as  the  avenger  of  the  wicked 
than  as  the  benefactor  of  the  pious,  since  he  perceives  it  to 
belong  to  His  glory  not  less  that  there  should  be  meted  out 
by  Him  punishment  to  the  impious  and  iniquitous,  than  the 
reward  of  eternal  life  to  the  righteous.  Moreover,  he  re- 
strains himself  from  sinning  not  merely  from  fear  of  punish- 
ment, but  because  he  loves  and  reverences  God  as  a father 
( loco  patris)  and  honors  and  worships  Him  as  Lord  ( loco 
domini) , and  even  though  there  were  no  hell  he  would  quake 
to  offend  Him.” 

We  have  quoted  this  eloquent  passage  at  length  because 
it  throws  into  prominence,  as  few  others  do,  Calvin’s  deep 
sense  not  merely  of  reverence  but  of  love  towards  God.  To 
him  true  religion  always  involves  the  recognition  of  God 
not  only  as  Lord  but  also  as  Father.  And  this  double  con- 
ception of  God  is  present  whether  this  religion  be  conceived 
as  natural  or  as  revealed.  “The  knowledge  of  God”,  says 
he  (I.  x.  2 fin.),  “which  is  proposed  to  us  in  the  Scriptures 
is  directed  to  no  other  end  than  that  which  is  manifested  to 
us  in  the  creation:  to  wit, -it  invites  us  first  to  the  fear  of 
God,  then  to  trust  in  Him;  so  that  we  may  learn  both 
to  serve  Him  in  perfect  innocence  of  life  and  sincere  obedi- 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god  425 

ence,  and  as  well  to  rest  wholly  in  His  goodness.”  That 
is,  in  a word,  the  sense  of  the  divine  Fatherhood  is  as 
fundamental  to  Calvin’s  conception  of  God  as  the  sense 
of  His  sovereignty.  Of  course,  he  throws  the  strongest 
conceivable  emphasis  on  God’s  Lordship:  the  sovereignty 
of  God  is  the  hinge  of  His  thought  of  God.  But  this 
sovereignty  is  ever  conceived  by  him  as  the  sovereignty  of 
God  our  Father.  The  distinguishing  feature  of  Calvin’s 
doctrine  of  God  is,  in  a word,  precisely  the  prevailing  stress 
he  casts  on  this  aspect  of  the  conception  of  God.  It  is  a 
Lutheran  theologian  who  takes  the  trouble  to  make  this 
plain  to  us.  “The  chief  elements  which  are  dealt  with  by 
Calvin  in  the  matter  of  the  religious  relation”,  he  says,  “are 
summed  up  in  the  proposition : God  is  our  Lord,  who 
has  made  us,  and  our  Father  from  whom  all  good  comes; 
we  owe  Him,  therefore,  honor  and  glory,  love  and  trust. 
We  must,  so  we  are  told  in  the  exposition  of  the  Decalogue 
in  the  first  edition  of  the  Institutes,  just  as  we  are  told  in 
Luther’s  Catechism — we  must  Tear  and  love’  God.  . . . 

[But]  we  find  in  the  Institutes,  and,  indeed,  particularly  in 
the  final  edition,  expressions  in  which  the  second  of  these 
elements  is  given  the  preference.  . . . We  may  find, 

indeed,  in  Luther  and  the  Lutherans,  the  element  of  fear 
in  piety  still  more  emphasized  than  in  Calvin.”106  In  a 
word,  with  all  his  emphasis  on  the  sovereignty  of  God, 
Calvin  throws  an  even  stronger  emphasis  on  His  love : and 
his  doctrine  of  God  is  preeminent  among  the  doctrines  of 
God  given  expression  in  the  Reformation  age  in  the  com- 
manding place  it  gives  to  the  Divine  Fatherhood.  “Lord 
and  Father” — fatherly  sovereign,  or  sovereign  Father — 
that  is  how  Calvin  conceived  God. 

It  was  precisely  because  Calvin  conceived  of  God  not 
only  as  Lord,  but  also  as  Father,  and  gave  Him  not  merely 
his  obedience  but  his  love,  that  he  burned  with  such  jealousy 
for  His  honor.  Everything  that  tended  to  rob  God  of  the 
honor  due  Him  was  accordingly  peculiarly  abhorrent  to  him. 


10*Kostlin,  as  cited,  pp.  424-5. 


426 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


We  cannot  feel  surprised,  therefore,  that  he  devotes  so  large 
a portion  of  his  discussion  of  the  doctrine  of  God  to  repell- 
ing that  invasion  of  the  divine  rights  which  was  wrought 
by  giving  the  worship  due  to  Him  alone  to  others,  and  par- 
ticularly to  idols  the  work  of  man’s  own  hand.  His  soul 
filled  with  the  vision  of  the  majesty  of  a God  who  will  not 
give  His  glory  to  another,  and  his  heart  aflame  with  a sense 
of  the  Fatherly  love  he  was  receiving  from  this  great  God, 
the  Lord  of  heaven  and  earth,  he  turned  with  passionate 
hatred  from  the  idolatrous  rites  into  which  the  worship  of 
the  old  Church  had  so  largely  degenerated,  and  felt  nothing 
so  pressingly  his  duty  as  to  trace  out  the  fallacies  in  the 
subtle  pleas  by  which  men  sought  to  justify  them  to  them- 
selves, and  so  far  as  lay  within  him  to  rescue  those  who 
looked  to  him  for  guidance  from  such  dreadful  profanation 
of  the  divine  majesty.  As  a practical  man,  with  his  mind 
on  the  practical  religious  needs  of  the  time,  this  “brutal 
stupidity”  of  men,  desiring  visible  figures  of  God — who  is 
an  invisible  Spirit — corrupting  the  divine  glory  by  fabri- 
cating for  themselves  gods  out  of  wood,  or  stone,  or  gold, 
or  silver,  or  any  other  dead  stuff,  seemed  to  him  to  call  for 
rebuke  as  little  else  could.  The  principle  on  which  he  pro- 
ceeds in  his  rebuke  of  idolatry  is  expressed  by  himself  in 
the  words,  that  to  attribute  to  anything  else  than  to  the  one 
true  God,  anything  that  is  proper  to  divinity  is  “to  despoil 
God  of  His  honor  and  to  violate  His  worship”.107  So  deeply 
rooted  is  the  jealousy  for  the  divine  honor  given  expression 
in  this  principle  not  only  in  Calvin’s  thought,  but  in  that  of 
the  whole  tendency  of  thought  which  he  represents,  that  it 
may  well  be  looked  upon  as  a determinative  trait  of  the 
Reformed  attitude — which  has  therefore  been  described  as 
characterized  by  a determined  protest  against  all  that  is 
pagan  in  life  and  worship.108 

107 1.  xii.  i : Quod  autem  priore  loco  posui,  tenendum  est,  nisi  in 
uno  Deo  resideat  quidquid  proprium  est  divinitatis,  honore  suo  ipsum 
spoliari,  violarique  ejus  cultum. 

108  Cf.  Schweizer,  Glaubenslehre  d.  rf.  Kirche,  i.  16:  “Only  an  essen- 
tially complete  survey  of  the  particular  Reformed  dogmas  can  lead  to 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god  427 

Certainly  the  zeal  of  Calvin  burned  warmly  against  the 
dishonor  he  felt  was  done  to  God  by  the  methods  of  wor- 
shipping Him  prevalent  in  the  old  Church.  God  has  re- 
vealed Himself  not  only  in  His  Word,  but  also  in  His 
works,  as  the  one  only  true  God.  But  the  vanity  of  man 
has  ever  tended  to  corrupt  the  knowledge  of  God  and  to 
invent  gods  many  and  lords  many,  and  not  content  with 
that,  has  sunk  even  to  the  degradation  of  idolatry, — fabri- 
cating gods  of  wood  or  stone,  gold  or  silver,  or  some  other 
dead  stuff.  It  is,  of  course,  not  idolatry  in  general,  but 
the  idolatry  of  the  Church  of  Rome  that  Calvin  has  his  eye 
particularly  upon,  as  became  him  as  a practical  man,  ab- 
sorbed in  the  real  problems  of  his  time.  He  therefore  par- 
ticularly animadverts  upon  the  more  refined  forms  of  idol- 
atry, ruthlessly  reducing  them  to  the  same  level  in  principle 
with  the  grossest.  God  does  not  compare  idols  with  idols, 
he  says,  as  if  one  were  better  and  another  worse : He  repu- 
diates all  without  exception, — all  images,  pictures  or  any 

the  fundamental  tendency  to  which  they  all  belong.  This  can  be  repre- 
sented as  a dominating  protest  against  all  that  is  pagan” ; p.  25 : “Pro- 
testation against  the  deification  of  the  creature  is  therefore  everywhere 
the  dominating,  all  determining  impulse  of  Reformed  Protestantism”. 
( Cf . pp.  40,  59,  and  the  exposition  there  of  how  this  principle  worked 
to  prevent  all  half-measures  and  inconsequences  in  the  development  of 
Reformed  thought.)  Cf.  also  Scholten,  De  Leer  d.  Hervorntde  Kerk., 
II.  13 : “Schweizer  finds  the  characteristic  of  the  Reformed  doctrine 
in  the  Biblical  principle  of  man’s  entire  dependence  on  God,  together 
with  protestation  on  the  ground  of  original  Christianity  against  any 
keathenish  elements  which  had  seeped  into  the  church  and  its  teaching. 
That  in  the  opposition  of  the  Reformed  to  Rome,  such  an  aversion  to  all 
that  is  heathenish  exhibited  itself,  history  tells  us.  and  cannot  be 
denied”;  p.  17:  “The  maintenance  of  the  sovereignty  of  God  is  the 
point  from  which,  with  the  Reformed,  everything  proceeds.  Hence  as 
well  their  protest  against  the  pagan  element  in  the  Romish  worship” 
. . . ; p.  15 1 : “What  led  Luther  to  repudiate  the  intercession  and 

adoration  of  Mary  and  the  saints  was  primarily  the  conviction  that  the 
saints  are  sinners  and  their  intercession  and  merits,  therefore,  cannot 
avail  us,  cannot  cover  our  sins  before  God.  Zwingli  and  Calvin  take  their 
starting  point  here,  from  the  conception  of  God  and  deny  that  the  love 
of  God  can  be  dependent  on  any  intercession,  and  reject  the  worship 
of  Mary  and  the  honoring  of  the  saints  as  a deification  of  creatures,  and 
an  injury  to  the  sovereignty  of  God”  ( cf . also  pp.  139-140:  16  sq.). 


428 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


other  kind  of  tokens  by  which  superstitious  people  have 
imagined  He  could  be  brought  near  to  them  (I.  xi.  1,  end). 
He  embraces  all  forms  of  idolatry,  however,  in  his  compre- 
hensive refutation ; he  even  expressly  adverts  to  the  “foolish 
subterfuge”  ( inepta  cautio ) of  the  Greeks,  who  allow 
painted  but  not  graven  images  (I.  xi.  4,  end).  Or  rather  he 
broadens  his  condemnation  until  it  covers  even  the  false 
conceptions  of  God  which  we  frame  in  our  imaginations 
(I.  xi.  4,  init.),  substituting  them  for  the  revelations  He 
makes  of  Himself : for  the  “mind  of  man”,  he  says,  “is,  if 
I may  be  allowed  the  expression,  a perpetual  factory  of 
idols”  (I.  xi.  8).  Thus  he  returns  to  “the  Puritan  concep- 
tion” which  we  have  seen  him  already  announcing  in  former 
chapters,  and  proclaims  as  his  governing  principle  (I.  xi.  4 
med.)  that  “all  modes  of  worship  which  men  excogitate 
from  themselves  are  detestable”.109 

He  does  not  content  himself,  however,  with  proclaiming 
and  establishing  this  principle.  He  follows  the  argument 
for  the  use  of  images  in  worship  into  its  details  and  refutes 
it  item  by  item.  To  the  plea  that  “images  are  the  books  of 
the  illiterate”  and  by  banishing  them  he  is  depriving  the 
people  of  their  best  means  of  instruction,  he  replies  that  no 
doubt  they  do  teach  something,  but  what  they  teach  is  false- 
hood: God  is  not  as  they  represent  Him  (§§  5-7).  To  the 
caveat  that  no  one  worships  the  idols,  but  the  deity  through 
the  idols ; that  they  are  never  called  ‘gods’  and  that  what  is 
offered  them  is  %ov\ela  not  Xarpeta  ; — he  replies  that  all 
this  is  distinction  without  difference ; the  Jews  in  their  idol- 
atry reasoned  in  a similar  manner,  and  it  is  easy  to  erect  a 
distinction  between  words,  but  somewhat  more  difficult  to 
establish  a real  difference  in  fact  (§§9-11).  To  the  re- 
proach that  he  is  exhibiting  a fanaticism  against  the  repre- 
sentative arts,  he  rejoins  that  such  is  far  from  the  case;  he 
is  only  seeking  to  protect  these  arts  from  abusive  applica- 
tion to  wrong  purposes  (§  12,  13).  And  finally  to  the 

109  Ut  hoc  fixum  sit,  detestabiles  esse  omnes  cultus  quos  a se  ipsis, 
homines  excogitant. 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god  429 

appeal  to  the  decisions  of  the  Council  of  Nice  of  786-7  fav- 
orable to  image-worship,  he  replies  by  an  exposure  of  the 
“disgusting  insipidities”  and  “portentous  impiety”  of  the 
image-worshipping  fathers  at  that  Council  (§  14  sq.).  The 
discussion  is  then  closed  (ch.  xii),  with  a chapter  in  which 
he  urges  that  God  alone  is  to  be  worshipped  and  only  in  the 
way  of  His  own  appointment;  and  above  all  that  His  glory 
is  not  to  be  given  to  another.  Thus  the  ever-present  danger 
of  idolatry,  as  evidenced  in  the  gross  practices  of  Rome,  is 
itself  invoked  to  curb  speculation  on  the  nature  of  the  God- 
head and  to  throw  men  back  on  the  simple  and  vitalizing 
revelation  of  the  word  of  a God  like  us  in  that  He  is  a 
spiritual  person,  but  unlike  us  in  that  He  is  clothed  in  incon- 
ceivable majesty.  These  two  epithets — immensity  and  spir- 
ituality— thus  stand  out  as  expressing  the  fundamental  char- 
acteristics of  the  divine  essence  to  Calvin’s  thinking:  His 
immensity  driving  us  away  in  terror  from  any  attempt  to 
measure  Him  by  our  sense ; His  spirituality  prohibiting  the 
entertainment  of  any  earthly  or  carnal  speculation  concern- 
ing Him.110 

In  the  course  of  this  discussion  there  are  three  matters 
on  which  Calvin  somewhat  incidentally  touches  which  seem 
too  interesting  to  be  passed  over  unremarked.  These  are 
what  we  may  call  his  philosophy  of  idolatry,  his  praise  of 
preaching,  and  his  recommendation  of  art. 

His  philosophy  of  idolatry111  takes  the  form  of  a psycho- 
logical theory  of  its  origin.  While  allowing  an  important 
place  in  the  fostering  and  spread  of  idolatry  to  the  ancient 
customs  of  honoring  the  dead  and  superstitiously  respecting 
their  memory,  he  considers  idolatry  more  ancient  than  these 
customs,  and  the  product  of  debased  thoughts  of  God.  He 
enumerates  four  stages  in  its  evolution.  First,  the  mind  of 
man,  filled  with  pride  and  rashness,  dares  to  imagine  a god 
after  its  own  notion;112  and  laboring  in  its  dullness  and 
sunk  in  the  crassest  ignorance,  naturally  conceives  a vain 

noI.  xiii.  i. 

111 1.  xi.  8,  9. 

113  pro  captu  suo. 


430 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


and  empty  spectre  for  God.  Next  man  attempts  to  give  an 
outward  form  to  the  God  he  has  thus  inwardly  excogitated ; 
so  that  the  hand  brings  forth  the  idol  which  the  mind 
begets.  Worship  follows  hard  on  this  figment:  for,  when 
they  suppose  they  see  God  in  the  images,  men  naturally 
worship  Him  in  them.  Finally,  their  minds  and  eyes  alike 
being  fixed  upon  the  images,  men  begin  to  become  more 
imbruted,  and  stand  amazed  and  lost  in  wonder  before  the 
images,  as  if  there  were  something  of  divinity  inherent 
in  them.  Thus  easy  Calvin  supposes  to  be  the  descent  from 
false  notions  of  deity  to  the  superstitious  adoration  of  stocks 
and  stones,  and  thus  clearly  and  reiteratedly  he  discovers 
the  roots  of  idolatry  in  false  conceptions  of  God  and  pro- 
claims its  presence  in  principle  wherever  men  permit  them- 
selves to  think  of  God  otherwise,  in  any  particular,  than  He 
has  revealed  Himself  in  His  works  and  word. 

As  we  read  Calvin’s  energetic  arraignments  of  the  sin- 
fulness of  our  deflected  conceptions  of  God, — the  essential 
idolatry  of  the  imaginary  images  we  form  of  Him — and 
our  duty  diligently  to  conform  our  ideas  of  God  to  the  reve- 
lations of  Himself  He  has  graciously  given  us,  we  are  re- 
minded of  an  eloquent  picture  which  the  late  Professor  A. 
Sabatier  once  drew113  of  a concourse  of  professing  Chris- 
tians coming  together  to  worship  in  common  a God  whom 
each  conceives  after  his  own  fashion.  Anthropomorphists, 
Deists,  Agnostics,  Pantheists — all  bow  alike  before  God  and 
worship,  says  Prof.  Sabatier : and  the  worship  of  one  and  all 
is  acceptable,  equally  acceptable,  to  God.  Not  so,  rejoins  M. 
Bois  :114  and  there  is  not  a less  admirable  spectacle  in  the 
world  than  this.  Calvin  was  of  M.  Bois’  opinion.  To  his 
thinking  we  have  before  us  in  such  a concourse  only  a com- 
pany of  idolaters — each  worshipping  not  the  God  that  is 
but  the  God  who  in  the  pride  of  his  heart  he  has  made 
himself.  And  to  each  and  all  Calvin  sends  out  the  cry  of, 

133  In  his  Discourse  on  the  Evolution  of  Religion,  quoted  by  H.  Bois, 
De  la  Connaissance  Religieuse,  p.  35. 

mAs  above,  p.  36. 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


43i 


Repent!  turn  from  the  God  you  have  made  yourself  and 
serve  the  God  that  is ! 

It  is  in  the  midst  of  his  response  to  the  specious  plea  that 
images  are  the  books  of  the  illiterate  and  the  only  means  of 
instruction  available  for  them  that  Calvin  breaks  out  into  a 
notable  eulogy  on  preaching  as  God’s  ordained  means  of 
instructing  His  people  (I.  xi.  7).  Even  though  images, 
he  remarks,  were  so  framed  that  they  bore  to  the  people  a 
message  which  might  be  properly  called  divine — which  too 
frequently  is  very  far  from  the  case — their  childish  sugges- 
tions ( naeniae ) are  little  adapted  to  convey  the  special  teach- 
ing which  God  wishes  to  be  taught  His  people  in  their  sol- 
emn congregations,  and  has  made  the  common  burden  of 
His  Word  and  Sacraments, — from  which  it  is  to  be  feared, 
however,  the  minds  of  the  people  are  fatally  distracted  as 
their  eyes  roam  around  to  gaze  on  their  idols.  Do  you  say 
the  people  are  too  rude  and  ignorant  to  profit  by  the  heav- 
enly message  and  can  be  reached  only  by  means  of  the 
images?  Yet  these  are  those  whom  the  Lord  receives  as 
His  own  disciples,  honors  with  the  revelation  of  His  celes- 
tial philosophy  and  has  commanded  to  be  instructed  in  the 
saving  mysteries  of  His  kingdom!  If  they  have  fallen  so 
low  as  not  to  be  able  to  do  without  such  “books”  as  images 
supply,  is  not  that  only  because  they  have  been  defrauded 
of  the  teaching  which  they  required?  The  invention  of 
images,  in  a word,  is  an  expedient  demanded  not  by  the 
rudeness  of  the  people  so  much  as  by  the  dumbness  of  the 
priests.  It  is  in  the  true  preaching  of  the  Gospel  that  Christ 
is  really  depicted — crucified  before  our  eyes  openly,  as  Paul 
testifies : and  there  can  be  no  reason  to  crowd  the  churches 
with  crucifixes  of  wood  and  stone  and  silver  and  gold,  if 
Christ  is  faithfully  preached  as  dying  on  the  cross  to  bear 
our  curse,  expiating  our  sins  by  the  sacrifice  of  His  body, 
cleansing  us  by  His  blood  and  reconciling  us  to  God  the 
Father.  From  this  simple  proclamation  more  may  be  learned 
than  from  a thousand  crosses.  Thus  Calvin  vindicates  to 
the  people  of  God  their  dignity  as  God’s  children  taught  by 


432 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


His  Spirit,  their  right  to  the  Gospel  of  grace,  their  capacity- 
under  the  instruction  of  the  Spirit  to  receive  the  divine  mes- 
sage, and  the  central  place  of  the  preaching  of  the  atonement 
of  Christ  in  the  ordinances  of  the  sanctuary. 

It  seems  the  more  needful  that  we  should  pause  upon 
Calvin’s  remarks  on  art  in  this  discussion  long  enough  to 
take  in  their  full  significance,  that  this  is  one  of  the  matters 
on  which  he  has  been  made  the  object  of  persistent  misrep- 
resentation. It  has  been  made  the  reproach  of  the  Refor- 
mation in  general  and  of  Calvinism  in  particular  that  they 
have  morosely  set  themselves  in  opposition  to  all  artistic 
development,  while  Calvin  himself  has  been  inveighed 
against  as  the  declared  enemy  of  all  that  is  beautiful  in  life. 
Thus,  for  example,  Voltaire  in  his  biting  verse  has  ex- 
plained that  the  only  art  which  flourished  at  Geneva  (where 
men  cyphered  but  could  not  laugh)  was  that  of  the  money- 
reckoners  : and  that  nothing  was  sung  there  but  the  antique 
concerts  of  “the  good  David”  in  the  belief  “that  God  liked 
bad  verses”.  Even  professed  students  of  the  subject  have 
passionately  assailed  Calvin  as  insensible  to  the  charms  of 
art  and  inimical  to  all  forms  of  artistic  expression.  Thus, 
M.  D.  Courtois,  the  historian  of  sacred  music  among  the 
French  Reformed,  permits  himself,  quite  contrary  to  the 
facts  in  the  sphere  of  his  own  especial  form  of  art,  to  say 
that  Calvin  “nourished  a holy  horror  for  all  that  could 
resemble  an  intrusion  of  art  into  the  religious  domain” ; and 
M.  E.  Muntz,  who  writes  on  “Protestantism  and  Art”, 
exclaims  that  “in  Calvin’s  eyes  beauty  is  tantamount  to 
idolatry”;  while  M.  O.  Douen,  the  biographer  of  Clement 
Marot,  brands  Calvin  as  “anti-liberal,  anti-artistic,  anti- 
human, anti-Christian”.  The  subject  is  too  wide  to  be 
entered  upon  here  in  its  general  aspects.  Professor  E.  Dou- 
mergue  and  Dr.  A.  Kuyper  have  made  all  lovers  of  truth 
their  debtors  by  exposing  to  the  full  the  grossness  of  such 
calumnies.115 

115  See:  A.  Kuyper,  Calvinisme  en  de  Kunst,  1888;  Calvinism Stone 
Lectures  for  1898-99,  Lecture  5;  E.  Doumergue,  L’Art  et  le  Sentiment 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


433 


In  point  of  fact  Calvin  was  a lover  and  fosterer  of  the 
arts,  counting  them  all  divine  gifts  which  should  be  cher- 
ished, and  expressly  declaring  even  of  those  which  minister 
only  to  pleasure  that  they  are  by  no  means  to  be  reckoned 
superfluous  and  are  certainly  not  to  be  condemned  as  if 
forsooth  they  were  inimical  to  piety.  Even  in  the  heat  of 
this  arraignment  of  the  misuse  of  art-representations  in 
idolatry  which  is  at  present  before  us,  we  observe  that  he 
turns  aside  to  guard  himself  against  being  misunderstood 
as  condemning  art-representations  in  general  (§  12).  The 
notion  that  all  representative  images  are  to  be  avoided  he 
brands  as  superstition  and  declares  of  the  products  both  of 
the  pictorial  and  of  the  sculptural  arts  that  they  are  the  gifts 
of  God  granted  to  us  for  His  own  glory  and  our  good.  “I 
am  not  held”,  he  says,  “in  that  superstition,  which  considers 
that  no  images  at  all  are  to  be  endured.  I only  require  that 
since  sculptures  and  pictures  are  gifts  of  God,  the  use  of 
them  should  be  pure  and  legitimate ; lest  what  has  been  con- 
ferred on  us  by  God  for  His  own  glory  and  for  our  good, 
should  not  only  be  polluted  by  preposterous  abuse,  but  even 
turned  to  our  injury.”  Here  is  no  fanatical  suspicion  of 
beauty:  no  harsh  assault  upon  art.  Here  is  rather  the 
noblest  possible  estimate  of  art  as  conducive  in  its  right 
employment  to  the  profit  of  man  and  the  glory  of  the  God 
who  gives  it.  Here  is  only  an  anxiety  manifested  to  protect 
such  a noble  gift  of  God  from  abuse  to  wrong  ends.  Ac- 
cordingly in  the  “Table  or  brief  summary  of  the  principal 
matters  contained  in  this  Institution  of  the  Christian  relig- 
ion”, which  was  affixed  to  the  French  edition  of  1560,  the 
contents  of  this  section  are  described  as  follows : “That 
when  idolatry  is  condemned,  this  is  not  to  abolish  the  arts  of 
painting  and  sculpture,  but  to  require  that  the  use  of  both 
shall  be  pure  and  legitimate,  and  we  are  not  to  amuse  our- 

dans  l’ Oeuvre  de  Calvin,  1902  (the  second  “Conference”  is  on  “Painting 
in  the  Work  of  Calvin”)  ; Jean  Calvin,  etc.,  II.  479-487;  Calvin  et  l’ Art 
in  Foi  et  Vie,  16  May,  1900.  Cf.  also  H.  Bavinck,  De  Algemene 
Genade ; also  Article  “Calvin  and  Common  Grace”  in  this  number  of 
this  Review,  pp.  437-465. 


28 


434 


THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


selves  by  representing  God  by  some  visible  figure  but  only 
such  things  as  may  be  objects  of  sight.”116  Calvin,  then, 
does  not  at  all  condemn  art,  but  only  pleads  for  a pure  and 
reverent  employment  of  art  as  a high  gift  of  God,  to  be  used 
like  all  others  of  God’s  gifts  so  as  to  profit  man  and  glorify 
the  Great  Giver. 

If  we  inquire  more  closely  what  he  held  to  be  a legitimate 
use  of  the  pictorial  arts,  we  must  note  first  of  all  that  he 
utterly  forbids  all  representations  of  God  in  visible  fig- 
ures.117 This  prohibition  he  rests  on  two  grounds:  first, 
God  Himself  forbids  it;  and  secondly,  “it  cannot  be  done 
without  some  deformation  of  His  glory”, — in  which  we 
catch  again  the  note  of  zeal  against  everything  which  de- 
tracts from  the  honor  of  God.  To  attempt  the  portraiture 
of  God  is,  thus,  to  Calvin,  not  merely  to  disobey  God’s 
express  command,  but  also  to  dishonor  Him  by  an  unworthy 
representation  of  Him,  which  is  essential  idolatry.  Highly 
as  he  esteemed  the  pictorial  arts,  as  worthy  of  all  admiration 
in  their  true  sphere,  he  condemned  utterly  pressing  them 
beyond  their  mark,  lest  even  they  should  become  procurers 
to  the  Lords  of  Hell.  We  note  secondly  that  he  dissuaded 
from  the  ornamentation  of  the  churches  with  the  products 
of  the  representative  arts;118  but  this  on  the  ground  not  of 
the  express  commandment  of  God  or  of  an  inherent  inca- 
pacity of  art  to  serve  the  purposes  contemplated,  but  of 
simple  expediency.119  Experience  teaches  us,  he  says,  that 
to  set  up  images  in  the  churches  is  tantamount  to  raising  the 
standard  of  idolatry,  because  the  folly  of  man  is  so  great 
that  it  immediately  falls  to  offerring  them  superstitious  wor- 
ship. And  a deeper  reason  lies  behind,  which  would  deter- 
mine his  judgment  even  if  this  peril  were  not  so  great.  The 

116  Opp.  iv.  1195.  Cf.  the  parallel  remark  in;  the  Genevan  Catechism  of 
1545  {Opp.  vi.  55)  : “It  is  not  to  be  understood  then,  that  all  sculpture 
and  painting  are  forbidden,  in  general;  but  only  all  images  which  are 
made  for  divine  service  or  for  honoring  Him  in  things  visible,  or  in 
any  way  abusing  them  in  idolatry.” 

117  Deum  effingi  visibile  specie  nefas  esse  putamus. 

118  Ch.  xiii. 

119  expediat. 


calvin’s  doctrine  of  god 


435 


Lord  has  Himself  ordained  living  and  expressive  images 
of  His  grace  for  His  temples,  by  which  our  eyes  should  be 
caught  and  held,  — such  ceremonies  as  Baptism  and  the 
Lord’s  Supper, — and  we  cannot  require  others  fabricated 
by  human  ingenuity;  and  it  seems  unworthy  of  the  sanctity 
of  the  place  to  intrude  them.  There  is,  of  course,  an  echo 
here  of  Calvin’s  fundamental  “Puritan  principle”  with  refer- 
ence to  the  worship  of  God : his  constant  and  unhesitating 
contention  that  only  that  worship  which  is  ordained  by  Him- 
self is  acceptable  to  God.  Had  God  desired  the  aid  of 
pictorial  representations  to  quicken  the  devotions  of  His 
people  He  would  have  ordained  them : to  employ  them  is  in 
principle  to  despise  the  provisions  He  has  made  and  to  in- 
vent others — and  we  may  be  sure  inadequate  if  not  mis- 
leading ones — for  ourselves. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  inquire  into  Calvin’s  positive 
theory  of  art-representation.  It  is  worth  while,  however, 
as  illustrating  the  wide  interests  of  the  man,  to  note  that  he 
has  such  a theory  and  betrays  the  fact  that  he  has  it  and 
somewhat  of  the  lines  on  which  it  runs,  in  incidental  re- 
marks, even  in  such  a discussion  as  this.  It  emerges,  for 
example,  that  he  would  confine  the  sphere  of  the  represen- 
tative arts  to  the  depicting  of  objects  of  sight  (ea  sola 
quorum  sint  capaces  oculi ) — of  such  things  as  the  eye  sees. 
Of  these,  however,  he  discovers  two  classes, — “histories  and 
transactions”  on  the  one  side,  “images  and  forms  of  bodies” 
on  the  other.120  The  former  may  be  made  useful  for  pur- 
poses of  instruction  or  admonition,  he  thinks;  the  latter,  so 
far  as  he  sees,  serve  only  the  ends  of  delectation.  Both  are, 
however,  alike  legitimate,  if  only  they  be  kept  to  their  proper 
places  and  used  for  their  proper  ends : for  the  delectation  of 
man  is  as  really  a human  need  as  his  instruction.  So  little 
does  Calvin  then  set  himself  with  stern  moroseness  against 
all  art-representation,  that  he  is  found  actually  forming  a 

120  A.  Bossert,  Calvin,  1906,  pp.  203-4,  after  quoting  this  statement  of 
Calvin’s  adds : “It  is  the  program  of  Dutch  painting”,  in  this  repeating 
what  E.  Doumergue  in  his  “Conference”  on  “Painting  in  the  Work  of' 
Calvin”  (as  cited,  pp.  36-51)  had  fully  set  forth. 


3 0112  059259561 


436  THE  PRINCETON  THEOLOGICAL  REVIEW 

comprehensive  theory  of  art-representation  and  pleading  for 
its  use,  not  only  for  the  profit,  but  also  for  the  pleasure 
of  man. 

It  remains  to  speak  of  Calvin’s  doctrine  of  the  Trinity. 
Princeton.  Benjamin  B.  Warfield. 


